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Synopsis: 
The Competition Act no.89 of 1998 coupled with its amendments ushered in a 
new era in the competition analysis and merger approval process in South Africa. 
This research paper's purpose is to intimately explore the emergent doctrine of 
"public interest" institutionalized in this new dispensation of competition 
legislation. 
In particular this report places under the spot light the treatment of public interest 
issues in case law jurisprudence as developed in the consideration and 
determination of large and notifiable mergers under the auspices of the 
Competition Tribunal of the Republic of South Africa since the inception of the 
said new legislative order. 
The efficacy of the determination of socio-political issues and pure competitive 
efficiency issues separately but under and by the same entity are also examined 
The contrast between the South African approach to the application of the 
doctrine of the public interest and that of some other competition jurisdictions 
abroad is also explored 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The enactment of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998i ('the Competition 
Act") ushered in a new era in the regulation of competition in South Africa. 
The said Act has since been refined through amendment with the passing 
of the Competition Amendment Act No.35 of 1999ii , the Competition 
Amendment Act No.15 of 2000iii and the Competition Second Amendment 
Act No.39 of 2000iv. 
1.1.0 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST DYNAMIC 
IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION 
As a point of departure it is important to note, as Creamer puts it, "the 
relationship between Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and the linkage 
of these policies to particular class and fractional interests is complex"v. 
lIya Yuzanov writes that on the face of things we may assume that "the 
antitrust authorities in most countries would prefer to base their 
implementation of competition policy on sound economic principlesllVi . He 
highlights that, however," competition policy does not function in a 
vacuum. It is influenced by other pocilies. Social, industrial-protectionist or 
consumer interest goals are sometimes "added" to competition policy 
through government/parliamentary decisions. So we may speak about 
political goals and political influence on competition policy. It may be 
discussed at great length as to whether it is bad or good, but we must 
admit that it is a widespread practice" vii. 
i Martin Brassey, John Campbell, Robert Legh, Charles Simkins, David Unterhalter, Jerome Wilson 
Competition Law, lSI ed (2002) by Juta 336. 
ii Brassey and five others 336 
iii Brassey and five others336 
iv Brassey and five others336 
v Creamer Kenneth, The Political Economy of Competition Law for TIPS FORUM, 20-22 September,1998 
vi Ilya Yuzanov, infra 
vii Ilya Yuzanov, Competition Law and Policy-the role of political influence, Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute, Chapter 25,2002 ed 
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Indeed, may we really pretend that there is a system of antitrust or 
competition regulation anywhere in the world that is based 100% purely on 
unadulterated market efficiency precepts and dynamics? Surely in the end 
it is not a question of kind but a matter of the degree to which any system 
of antitrust or competition regulation is influenced in its body of law and 
practice by such departures from supposedly "classically pure" market 
efficiency principles and precepts. 
After all, as Justice Lewis so aptly reminds us, the essence of the role of 
antitrust/competition law," its historic and continuing role" was and is 
"supporting the powerless against the powerful"viiiin the economic jungle. 
Is animosity to the buttressing and edification of public interest precepts in 
their codification through legislation not then a paradoxical denial of the 
very soul and essence of the underlying purpose of this body of the law? 
1.1.1 AN OVERARCHING VIEW OF THE KEY DISTINCTIVE 
CHARACTERISTICS AND THE ETHIC BEHIND THE NEW 
COMPETITION LEGISLATIVE DISPENSATION 
As we discuss the emergent casuistic jurisprudence of the Competition 
Tribunal in the context of this essay it is manifest, in keeping with the 
observations of Juzanov and Lewis above, the said Competition Tribunal 
case jurisprudence has not unfolded in a socio-political and economic 
vacuum. Analysis of certain insight deepening aspects of such broader 
context will accordingly form a feature of this work. In the wake of the 
collapse of the political order underpinned by legislated discrimination in 
South Africa, the post-apartheid government of the country envisioned in 
the Competition Act a significant tool for "industrial and social policy"ix. 
viii Justice Lewis infra 622 
ix Brassey and five others 88 
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It also saw the new statute as going well beyond addressing "pure 
competition"x matters and devised it to try and accomplish a "plurality of 
objectives"xi, consumer welfare being but one of them. It also 
contemplated the Competition Act as a vehicle for "restructuring industry"Xii 
in the country and in addition to accommodate the pressing demands and 
aspirations of "previously disadvantaged communities, small business and 
labour"xiii 
Analyzing the thinking behind this new transitional and tranformative 
dynamism, Justice David Lewis, the Chairperson of the Competition 
Tribunal in South Africa states, interalia, that "The new regime clearly 
seeks to distinguish Itself by its promotion of greater equality to access to 
wealth and income earning opportunities; it wants interest groups 
marginalized by the previous order, essentially the new party's electoral 
constituency, to be the principal beneficiaries behind the new order. 
However government also recognizes that these distributional goals can 
be achieved only through a significant improvement in economic 
performance, in economic efficiency".xiv 
In elaboration, Justice Lewis discloses how the school of thought behind 
the new competition regulation order, in essence, meets the strong 
objections to its alleged "polluting" of "classical, state of the art" antitrust or 
competition jurisprudence. He observes, "South Africa's political leaders 
do not in common with most of their kin in the rest of the world view these 
objectives [to wit, the aforesaid ones of distribution and significant 
economic performance and economic efficiencyyvas mutually exclusive. 
x Brassey and five others 88 
xi Brassey and five others20 
xii Brassey and five others 88 
xiii Brassey and five others 88 
xiv see David Lewis, The Political Economy of Antitrust, in Fordham Corporate Law Institute, B Hawk 
Ed, 2002, 617 
xv The portion in square brackets is the Author's own restatement of Judge Lewis' words in the immediately 
preceding paragraph, to afford flowing contextual readability 
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They do not, in other words, easily accept or admit to an efficiency/equity 
trade-off. On the contrary, the popular view in South African society is that 
poor economic performance is, in large part, a product of power relations 
that excluded the majority from access to the economy. Concretely these 
broad objectives translate into support for, interalia, black economic 
empowerment (seen largely as broadening the ownership of economic 
assets), for small and medium sized enterprises and for job retention and 
creation. In order to achieve any credibility in the society, every major 
piece of legislation would have to embody, in letter and spirit, this range of 
objectives "xvi 
Such thinking, accordingly, is what informs the Competition Act's 
extending, on public interest provisions, significantly beyondXVii those of 
comparable legislation in some other offshore legal jurisdictions with a 
longer history of regulating competition. 
1.1 .2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
The Competition Tribunal, established in terms of section 26 of the 
Competition Act, is a juristic person and a tribunal of record with a 
Chairperson, at least three members and not more than ten members, 
who serve on a full time or part time basis at the Minister'sxviii 
recommendation. The members are appointed by the PresidentXiX from a 
list of persons nominated by the Minister and upon consultation with the 
Minister after or without a process of public consultation. 
The ordinary term of each member is five years, subject to renewal by the 
President, provided that no person may serve as Chairperson for more 
than two consecutive terms. 
xvi David Lewis supra, 617. 
xvii Brassey and five others supra 88 
xviii The South African Minister of State responsible for competition 
xix The State President of South Africa 
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The Deputy Chairperson, who deputizes for the Chairperson in his or her 
absence, is appointed where the President on the Minister's 
recommendation so appoints a member of the tribunalxx. 
In keeping with the now proverbial "rainbow nation" tone, Parliament, in 
terms of section 28 of the Competition Act provided that in constituting the 
Tribunal the Executive had to effect such, interalia, in such a way that 
when it is "viewed collectively" the Tribunal must "represent a broad cross 
section of the population of the Republic"xxi. 
It is a further requirement of the Competition Act that the Tribunal must be 
so made up that that it has a sufficient number of legally trained and 
experienced members thereof to enable its Chairperson to comply with the 
demands thereon of section 31 (2) (a) of the Competition Act. That sub 
section dictates that each panel of the Tribunal to which the Chairperson 
assigns a matter (in terms of subsection 1 of the said section 31) must 
have at least one legally trained and experienced person in its 
compositionxxii . 
1.2 LARGE MERGERS 
In terms of Section 11 of the Competition Act, pertaining to "Thresholds 
and Categories of Mergers" the Minister responsible for the portfolio under 
which the regulation of competition falls, upon consultation with the 
Competition Commission and after a process of public consultation 
commenced by means of a Ministerial notice in the gazette, from time to 
time, to create thresholds which delineate the three different categories of 
mergers. 
xx Brassey and five others supra 350 
xxi A reference to the Republic of South Africa; Brassey and five others supra 350, 
xxii Brassey and five others supra, 351 
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The largest of these, the subject of analysis, is "large mergers" which are 
delineated in terms of section 11 (3) (c) of the said Act. 
If we are to confine our public interest analysis on mergers to large 
mergers we have to first determine what the threshold for large mergers 
presently is 
The answer lies via the lower merger thresholds. 
"Small Mergers" under present thresholds have been pegged as those 
mergers "whose turnover or asset values fall below either of the minimum 
thresholds?XXiii" 
"Intermediate Mergers" have been designated as those mergers "whose 
turnover or asset values fall between R200 million and R3, 5 billion, where 
the turnover or asset value of the target is above R300million but below 
R 100 millionxxiv . 
"Large Mergers" are weighted as those mergers "which equal or exceed 
one or both of the "higher thresholds"xxv. 
Put another way large mergers are those mergers which equal or exceed 
R3,5 billion and where the target entity's asset value is equal to or higher 
than R100 million. 
According to the Competition Commission's report for 2005-2006 it 
"received 408 mergers notifications ... 97 of which were large mergers."XXVi 
xxiii Presentation notes for Certificate Course in Competition Law, University of Cape Town, .25-27 July, 
2005 N Hlatshwayo, of Webber Wetzel Bowens Mergers & Acquisitions 
xxiv N Hlatshwayo supra 
xxv N Hlatswayo supra 
xxvi Irvine Heather and Morphet Lesley of Deneys Reitz attorneys, Business and Tax Law Review 
supplement No.1 ,3,February ,2007,B usiness Day, 12th February ,2007. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the turnaround time in terms of decision 
making is still considered to be "within international benchmarks"xxvii the 
case is already being made that rise in the the case load of notifiable 
mergers perhaps warrants an amendment of the Act "to facilitate a more 
speedy approval process"XXViii. 
One of the recommendations made in that regard is that the "monetary 
merger thresholds" be raised, which would enable a smaller number of 
mergers requiring statutory reviewxxix. The downside noted if that were to 
happen is a potential for more mergers that are not market efficient 
creeping through "under the fences", as it were, by facility of the less 
stringent regulatory netXx. 
As a further suggestion for relieving pressure on the regulatory authorities 
Hervine and Morphet note a suggestion being mooted by the Law Society 
of the Northern Province of South Africa in terms of which the Competition 
on Act could be amended to allow for "short form filings" (like in several 
other competition jurisdictions) and "long form filings"Xxxi. It is suggested 
that under such a position it would only be "mergers which raise 
substantial competition law or public interest concerns would require the 
"long form filing" and be subject to detailed review by tribunal."xxxii 
The qualification is made, however, that that tribunal would retain an 
overview role ("big brother", if you like) over the proceedings in any and all 
matters and "could require transactions filed using the short- form filing, to 
be converted to a long form -filing if necessary"xxxiii. 
xxvii Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxviii Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxviii Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxviii Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxix Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxx Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxxi Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxxii Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxxiii Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
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It is intimated that this would free up the Competition Commission to 
determine uninvolved acquisitions "even of the deal values classifies then 
as large mergers"XXXiV. It will be a matter of much interest to all competition 
law and practice esotericisms to see how this debate pans out. 
1.3 THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMPETITION 
TRIBUNAL IN LARGE MERGERS 
Section 16(2) of the Competition Act provides for the process by which the 
Tribunal should receive large merger cases for their disposal on referral 
thereof from and by the Commission and the Tribunal may, in determining 
the same,"(a) approve the merger ;(b) approve the merger subject to any 
condition (c) prohibit implementation of the merger"XXXv 
Section 16(3) and (4) of the Competition Act provides interalia for the 
revocation by the Commission of its own decision upon application by the 
Commission and for the peremptory publication of its decision in terms of 
section 16(2) or 16(3) of such Act and enjoins the tribunal to give written 
reasons for any such decisionxxxvi. 
1.5 STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS 
The Competition Act at section 10(8) thereof provides for the Competition 
Tribunal to hear any appeals by any other person with "a substantial 
financial interest" (who is affected by such decision) against a decision by 
the Competition Commission in terms of subsection (2), (4A)or(5)XXXVii of 
Section 10 of such Act, in the exercise of its exemption dispensing 
jurisdiction. 
xxxiv Irvine and Morphet supra,3 
xxxv Brassey and five others, 347 
xxxvi Brassey and five others,347 
xxxvii Brassey and five others 343 
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The Competition Act does not define the import of "substantial financial 
interest" and presumably that falls for the Tribunal to determine in the 
future in a case in point coming before it. 
1.5 THE DEFINITION OF "PUBLIC INTEREST" 
The phrases "public interest" and "public policy" are often used 
interchangeably. A tantalizing debate churning in the author's mind is 
whether it cannot be meaningfully argued that laws to secure the public 
interest are passed in pursuit of pre-existing policy that warrants that 
which is dear to society in terms of its norms. 
That, in effect, therefore, public interest is subsumed in public policy; that 
public policy is more immediately anchored in the roots of a society's 
fundamental psyche as to who it essentially perceives itself to be than 
public interest, which resolves itself essentially into a social tool made and 
intended for and applied to the realization of the society's norms and 
mores promise to itself, as borne by public policy. 
A contrary argument would be that there are countries where what is in the 
public interest has not been codified as to its bolts and nuts and much 
discretion is left to the courts through case law and stare decisis to unfold 
the substance and precedent of what it entails in practice. Secondly, public 
policy can be made and changed by society as society evolves, just like a 
society's perception of what is in the public interest at a given time. 
This, even before one factors into the complex the consideration that 
members of the public's views in a given society on any social question 
never constitute a monolithic edifice; that such diverse views themselves 
are, in any event, a dynamic phenomenon. Indeed, not infrequently, such 
dynamism outstrips the given polity's lawmakers' capacity or, for that 
matter, aggregated willingness to promptly reflect, from time to time, in 
10 
consequential legislation the emergently dominant shades of social 
perception and preference, (albeit, possibly only transiently so dominant). 
While this debate may be important, its resolution is inessential for the 
purposes of this report and the author will leave the jury out thereon .He 
will proceed on the premise that the two phrases are interchangeable and 
of the same essence; so emboldened by abita dicta in some merger 
proceedings where the same phenomena has been treated of by the 
Competition Tribunal with a utilization of both terms exchangeably. 
In our law, as a general rule agreements are "prohibited by common law" if 
they are contrary to public policy or are "contra bonos mores (against 
good morals,,)"xxxviii. 
Gibson sets out that it is fraught with complexity to try and define public 
policy and good morals as they "change constantly"XXXiX. 
As we commence analysis herein, perhaps it is prudent to remind 
ourselves of how long judicial minds have wrestled with public policy 
issues with this quote from a1896 English case which Gibson points us to: 
"Public policy is a restive horse and when once you get astride of it 
there is no knowing where it will take you": Cleaver v Mutual reserve 
fund Life Association" [1892] QB 47xl. 
1.6 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF "PUBLIC INTEREST" 
Section 1 of the Definition and Interpretation section of the Competition 
Act Xli, which one would be inclined to first peruse and look to for guidance 
xxxviii JTR GIBSON, assisted by RGM COMRIE, MERCANTILE AND COMPANY LAW ,6th Ed, Juta 11 
xxxix JTR Gibson supra 
xl JTR Gibson supra 
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in this regard, does not specifically afford us a definition of the phrase 
"public interest". The Competition Act as a general point of departure 
renders unlawful "mergers likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition"xlii. 
MERGER IMPLICATIONS FOR THE "PUBLIC INTEREST": 
The Competition Commission ('the Commission") and the Competition 
Tribunal ("the Tribunal") must also enquire into the transaction's 
implications for the "public interest"Xliii .The Tribunal may grant consent for 
a merger or refuse it on public interest considerations "whether or not the 
merger is anticompetitive"xliv. 
Despite the seemingly broad terms of Section 12 A (1) of the Competition 
Act which require the Commission or Tribunal to "not only assess mergers 
from a competition perspective, but also from a public interest 
perspective", Section 12A (3) thereof surely narrows "the public interest 
jurisdiction" to determination of the impact, if any, that a merger will have 
on: 
" a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
b) employment; 
c) the ability of small business, or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
d) the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets ,,«Iv " 
xli Brassey and five others 336 
xlii N Hlatshwayo, of Webber Wetzel Bowens Mergers &Acquisitions; Presentation notes for Certificate 
Course in Competition Law, University of Cape Town .25-27 July, 2005. 
xliii Eleanor M. Fox, Lawrence A Sullivan, Rudolph JR Peritz , Cases and Materials on U.S. ANTITRUST 
IN GLOBAL CONTEXT (American Case Book Series) second edition (2004),by THOMAS WEST 
353. 
xliv Fox 353 
xlv Brassey and five others 336 
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Justice Lewis writes that certain jurisdictions " ... put the public interest or 
distributional issues in the act and oblige the competition authority to make 
the trade off. This is the approach followed in the South African 
Competition Act. Hence mergers, for example, are first evaluated on 
standard competition criteria and then this decision has to be weighed up 
against the impact on the stated public interest criteria-employment, small 
business and Black economic empowerment. Is this ideal? No it isn't .Is it 
price worth paying for the credibility of the authority? Yes it certainly is"xlvi 
Accordingly, operationally the Tribunal does its work in each merger 
approval matter in a staggered two-stage fashionx1vii . Indeed, 
notwithstanding that the tribunal may have reached the conclusion that a 
particular merger will facilitate intensified competition in the market 
segment of the merged entity, the public interest determination must yet 
be made and "separately and independently"Xlviii. 
Justice Lewis very articulately maps out the analysis process's phases 
and planes as follows: "Note also that the act requires a definite 
sequencing of the analyses-first the impact on competition is analysed; 
secondly, an anticompetitive transaction is examined for its impact on 
public interest factors. In short, the balance is always struck through the 
filter of a competition analysis. The upshot is that the outcome of the 
competition analysis will tend to lead the decision to approve or prohibit a 
transaction on public interest influencing the imposition of conditions."xlix 
To place it all in overall perspective, Justice Lewis discloses that in the two 
years that had passed (as at the time of his writing) since the tribunal he 
chaired came into existence, no decision "to approve or prohibit a 
transaction on public interest grounds" had ever been made and that all 
xlvi David Lewis supra,620 
xlvii N Hlatshwayo supra 
xlviii N Hlatswayo supra 
xlix Justice Davis supra621 
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the Tribunal's decisions had been reached on "competition grounds, with 
the only exception being "an occasion on which an anticompetitive 
transaction was approved on efficiency grounds" in the matter of 
Schumann SASOL (SA)(PTY) LIMITED AND PRICE's 
DAELlTE(PTY)LlMITED Case No.23/LM/May/2001 1 
In the light of Justice Lewis' shortly aforegoing remarks and of the fact that 
the focus of this research report is "public interest" considerations, the 
analytical approach herein, unless the contrary is indicated in a given 
instance, will be to take it as a given that the merger consent application in 
each matter has already been deemed compliant in respect to the 
question of market efficiency. 
Justice Lewis continues to indicate that "Our act provides nothing by way 
of rules and guidelines for balancing public interest and competition 
considerations and so these have to be developed in the investigative 
practice and in the Tribunal's decisions,,1i 
Perhaps at the very outset the author may safely indicate that most of the 
reported tribunal cases have disclosed matters where there simply have 
not been any material public interest issues and the bulk of the merger 
consent application issues coming up before the tribunal have turned 
around pure market efficiency considerations. 
I Justice Davis supra 621 
Ii David Lewis supra,621 
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1.7 THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The Author has determined to proceed within a six part analytical 
framework in the treatment of the public interest issues and matters 
ancillary thereto, in the following order: 
(i) PART A" 
"EMPLOYMENT"; 
(ii) PARTB 
"THE ABILITY OF SMALL BUSINESS, OR FIRMS 
CONTROLLED OR OWNED BY HISTORICALLY 
DISADVANTAGED PERSONS, TO BECOME COMPETITIVE" 
(iii) PARTe 
"PARTICULAR INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OR REGION"; 
(iv) PARTD 
"THE ABILITY OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIES TO 
COMPETE IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS" 
(Vii) PART E: 
A BIRO'S EYE VIEW OF SOME KEY CONTRASTS WITH 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH IN THE TREATMENT OF 
PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS IN CERTAIN 
FOREIGN COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS 
(Viii) PART F: 
SOME CLOSING INSIGHTS 
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(i) PART "A": 
2.2 "EMPLOYMENT" 
The word "employment" as utilized in section 12 A (3) (b)lii thereof is not 
interpreted by the Competition Act. Hence, presumably Parliament had no 
intention for it to bear a dedicated or a specialised sense for purposes of 
the said Act. Perhaps we may safely deduce therefrom that neither did 
Parliament intend it to have a strand or shade of meaning necessarily 
distinguishable from that derivable from the body of South African labour 
law or even, for that matter, from the mundane dictionary one. 
Indeed, the author is also not aware of any matter that has come before 
the Tribunal for determination where the strict import of the word 
"employment "as applied in the said section 12 A (3) (b) of the Competition 
Act has been pivotal to the disposal of the case and where "employment " 
was concurrently the emergent public interest dynamic for determination. 
In most incidences when dealing with public interest considerations, the 
competition authorities have largely focused on the employment aspectliii. 
This, it would appear, because those were the emergent inherent public 
interest issues in those matters. 
As the writer was analysing the tribunal's body of case law with a particular 
eye on the post merger employment dynamics, it emerged quite distinctly 
that in the vast majority of these cases employment was either not an issue 
at all or not an insurmountable one when it presented and merger approval 
was in fact granted. 
Iii Brassey and five others345 
liiiN Hlatshwayo presentation notes for certificate course in competition law, university of cape town .25-27 
July, 2005 of Webber Wentzel Bowens Mergers &Acquisitions 
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In this vein, quite a notable number of cases were, indeed, found by the 
Tribunal to have no significant public interest issues of any kind 
whatsoever. 
It will emerge in this paper that in most of the cases before the Tribunal 
where the foreseeability of significant merger-consequent loss of 
employment was the case, merger consent was nevertheless granted 
subject to certain conditions specifically intended to ameliorate the reality 
underlying such concerns .. 
This is probably due in part to the likelihood that certain merging entities 
appear to proceed to significant lengths to ensure that the merger structure 
or model they elect for presentation to the Commission and eventually to 
the Tribunal is as compliant with public interest considerations (including 
employment preservation measures) as possible. 
A further emergent reason for this, from what the author could decipher 
from the Tribunal's accumulated body of case law, were the concerted 
efforts of Counsel for the merging entities and/or those of the Commission, 
as the case may be, to explore, negotiate and present alternative 
acceptable conditional approval scenarios to the Tribunal; to the Tribunal's 
own willingness to weigh the same's practical viability and legal efficacy in 
the light of the public interest considerations in focus. This, in the event that 
the Tribunal was not prepared in a given case to approve the merger 
parties' application for relief strictly as filed. 
Some of the analysis in the tribunal's body of case law in this regard, 
though in certain instances amounting to no more than obita dicta, is 
nevertheless fairly momentous. It is revealing of the Tribunal's tendentious 
inclinations as it pursues the quest to ensure that in respect to public 
interest issues as well it complied with both the letter and the spirit of the 
new competition dispensation. 
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It is conceivable also that in a case where the tribunal granted merger 
consent subject to certain conditions' being adhered to by the merger 
entities, while the concern's warranting the imposition of the conditions did 
not result in merger consent's being declined, they nonetheless disclose 
the tribunal's inherent willingness to decline consent were the matter one 
where the Tribunal was convinced that no conditions' imposition could 
remove or meaningfully ameliorate the mischief targeted by the conditions' 
imposition. 
Indeed, these traits of the Tribunal's reasoning will in future, in appropriate 
circumstances, no doubt positively influence actual decisions to decline or 
approve merger consent for employment related public interest reasons. 
Even now these considerations must surely be influencing merger 
agreement configurations and merger-consent application structuring 
dynamics. 
While such matter is in view, may the author caution that he found it 
compelling for this research report to be as much about how the Tribunal 
disposed of matters where in its determination the public interest 
presented, as about why in several instances what ostensibly constituted 
an incidence of or issues privy to the public interest, no genuine and/or 
material public interest considerations were found to be in play by the 
Tribunal. 
2.1.1 MERGER LIKELY TO LEAD TO MAJOR LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT 
In AGRI OPERATIONS LIMITED / DAYBREAK FARMS 
(PROPRIETARY) LlMITED1iv the Commission was interalia perturbed that 
the transaction could result in significant employment loss. Maersk had 
disclosed to the Commission that it foresaw the said merger resulting in 
liv Case No. 113,Large Mergers NOV 2003,Competition Tribunal website 
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the loss of about 5% or 1,500 jobs around the world in the merged entity in 
a term of 5 yearslv. 
Notwithstanding that the merger entities had intimated that retrenchments 
in South Africa were improbable "as natural attrition over time might 
obviate the need for retrenchments"lvi the Commission was nevertheless 
still unsettled about this aspect. 
The merger entities in the circumstances volunteered to accept an 
approval condition in respect of safeguarding employment that the 
Commission found satisfactorlii .The tribunal was of the mind that in the 
light of the significant levels in terms of merger triggered loss of 
employment opportunities, especially with regards to "unskilled workers" 
that the said condition was warranted'viii and it decided that no "unskilled 
employees" of the merged entity should be retrenched for "a period of 
twelve months" from the date of the Tribunal's order approving the 
mergerliX. 
2.1.2 EMERGENT PROSPECTS OF NEW EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
BEING CREATED POST MERGER SUBMITTED AS PART OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 
In the matter of KWV LTD ('KWV") / NMZ SCHULZ FINE WINE AND 
SPIRITS (PROPRIETARY) L1MITEDlx it was the collective submission of 
the merging entities that the merger would have no negative implications 
for the public interest Ixi. Indeed, on the contrary, the merging parties made 
out the case that they were anticipating that the merged entity would in all 
Iv Case 113 supra, 4 
Ivi Case 113 supra,4 
Ivii Case 113 supra,4 
Iviii Case 113 supra,4 
lix Case 113,supra 4 
Ix Case No.74/Large Mergers/SEP, 2006,.Competition Tribunal website 
Ixi Case No. 74 supra 
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probability have to increase employment to enable it "to cope with the 
distribution of the additional volumes of KWV's alcoholic beverages"IXii 
In approving this merger transaction without conditions the Tribunal 
rejected the relevant Union, the Food and Allied Workers Union's (FAWU) 
submission, which essentially sought the imposition of a "moratorium on 
retrenchments for a period of 48 months subsequent to the merger"IXiii. The 
basis for such rejection was evidential inadequacy in FAWU's submission 
as to whether there was any basis for anticipating any retrenchments in 
the first place1xiv. 
The Tribunal's approach in this matter disclosed that it was not going to be 
feeble handed in the treatment of evidential compliance issues, even in 
matters where public interest considerations were allegedly in play. In 
other words the "public interest" is not a soft issue that requires no more 
than to be alleged and then hooked up trailer like to a somewhat plausible 
tale. Though the Tribunal's judgment does not spell that out in so many 
words this approach is presumably to ensure that public interest was only 
invoked where it could be materially established that such considerations 
were, indeed, in play. 
This, in turn, presumably to ensure that there was no question either of 
abuse of such doctrine nor any unwarranted resisting and/or encumbering 
of merger application proceedings that were in essence innocuous or even 
positive from a public interest perspective. It is, of course, trite in our law in 
that " ... the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts" Ixv. 
Ixii Case No 74 supra. 
Ixiii Case No 74 supra 
Ixiv Case No 74 supra 
Ixv See Pillay v Krishna,1946 AD 946 cited in Henry John May, South African Cases and Statutes of 
Evidence, 4th Ed., 1962 by Juta 19 
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One further senses an undertone in the Tribunal's approach to this matter, 
that as much as it welcomes large mergers which have a positive impact 
on employment in the nature of a probable need and likelihood for the post 
merger entity to take on more employees that the pre-merger entities had 
put together, the key employment centric concern of the Tribunal, where 
applicable, is an emergent prospect of significant job losses post merger 
that are peculiarly merger triggered or merger specific. 
Looming significant retrenchments due to the merger (as already 
disclosed) were clearly not in evidence in this matter. There being no other 
public interest contentions merger consent was granted unconditionallylXvi. 
2.1.3 THE TRIBUNAL'S PERSPECTIVE ON CLAIMS OF ALLEGED 
PROSPECTIVE MERGER TRIGGERED JOB CREATION 
In this matter 
(PROPRIETARY) 
of INZUZO FURNITURE 
LIMITED AND PG 
MANUFACTURERS 
BISON HOLDINGS 
(PROPRIETARY) LlMITEDlxviiwhich has some of the characteristics of the 
preceding KWV matter, the merger entities, who were exploiting the 
opportunities availed by the Eastern Cape cluster development, made 
representations to the Tribunal that the transaction had "vital public 
interest benefits"lxviii that had to be factored in in assessing the merger 
application. 
The merger parties posited that the chipboard plant inside the cluster 
development settlement would trigger the creation of "280 direct jobs and 
approximately 1766 indirect jobs within the cluster development itself"lxix. 
lxvi Case No 74 Supra 
lxvii Case No. 12/Large MergersIFEB04,16 
lxviii Case No.12 supra,16 
lxix Case No.12 supra, 16 
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Expressed differently the submission being made here was that this 
transaction was not merely innocuous from a public interest perspective, 
but that it was firmly positive for the public interest. 
The Tribunal's view was that the alleged employment benefits submission 
did not stand up to close scrutiny in that the said jobs projected to be 
created were not directly merger specific'xx. Nevertheless there was 
nothing of record that militated against the public interest in this matter.1xxi 
We see the Tribunal firing a broadside here, hinting that it will not allow 
itself to be hoodwinked into factoring in merger specific "efficiencies"lxxii 
that were really attributable to the cluster development more generically. 
The merger was ultimately approved conditionally with the Tribunal 
content that it adequately offset the perceived "potential anti-competitive 
effects" thereof. 
2.1.4 NEW POSITIONS RESULTANT FROM MERGER 
TO STEM POSSIBLE RETRENCHMENTS 
In MURRAY AND ROBERTS LIMITED AND OCONBRICK 
MANUFACTURING (PTY) LTD PURPLE RAIN PROPERTIES NO. 421 
(PTY) LIMITED AND P.S. TRANSPORT (PTY) LTDlxxiii the merging 
entities submitted that at the most "25 of the 306 employees", who 
happened to be "senior management and administrative staff" of 
WUDGMC could in a "worst-case scenario" lose their employment The 
merger parties had represented to the Commission that they would 
endeavour as much as possible to absorb these employees in 23 new 
merger consequent employment positions. 
In Case no.12, 16 
Ixxi Case No.12,16 
Ixxii Case No.12,16 
Ixxiii Case No.51Large Mergers, June 05,Competition Tribunal website 
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2.1.5 CONCEIVABLY BRIGHTER PROSPECTS FOR EMPLOYEES DUE TO 
THEIR BEING SUBSUMMED INTO A LARGER EMPLOYER ENTITY 
In this matter of SANDOWN MOTOR HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED AND 
PAARL MOTORS (PTY) LlMITEDlxxiv a public interest compliance case 
was made going beyond that no threat to existing employment levels and 
no other negatively impacted public interest issues were in the scenario. It 
was submitted that there was also a foreseeable benefit "to the one 
hundred and eight (108) current employees of Paarl Motors since they 
"would all be employed by SMH, a larger vehicle dealer"lxxv. 
Here we see the merging parties seeking to persuade the Tribunal that 
such employees' being subsumed into a bigger employer entity would 
create a more stable base for their retention. Presumably the suggestion 
was that a bigger entity was by definition also more stable than a smaller 
one; that, as it were, ipso facto that detail, the jobs at stake would thus 
also be more sustainable or stable. The corporate US energy giant 
Enron's spectacular collapse in recent years, of course, is a classic 
example of the fact that this stability due to size type factor is not 
necessarily and always true, The tribunal, like in the KWV matter, did not 
make much of this and was clearly more interested in the assurances that 
no employees of the affected entities would be retrenched post merger. 
Indeed, the Tribunal in approving the merger unconditionally did no more 
than allude to the fact that the submission that such said employees would 
be employed by a bigger entity had been madelxxvi. 
Ixxiv Case No.65 Large Mergers,August,2006 
Ixxv Case No.65 supra 
Ixxvi Case No.65 supra 
2.1.6 MERGER TO RESULT IN NOTABLE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, 
EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
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In SIEMENS LIMITED AND MARGOTT HOLDINGS (PRAULUS) 
LlMITEDlxxvii the merging parties contended that the pending merger 
transaction would cause a major accentuation of "skills development" 
Ixxviiiand greater employment spin OffSlxxix. 
It was submitted in support of the merger that on effecting the merger 
Siemens would take into its employ all the employees of MarqottlXXX. 
The Tribunal also positively noted that the merging entities offered, of their 
own motion, to have imposed on the merged entity a condition, as part of 
the disposal of shareholding in Marqott, to wit, that "no Marqott employees 
may be retrenched for a period of two years"IXXXi from the transaction 
approval date. 
Moreover, the merging entities represented that the primary motivation for 
the mooted merger was the facilitation of the emergent entity's 
transforming into a key competitor in a market where robust business 
growth was anticipated following significant foreseen expansion in 
electricity project infrastructure expenditurelxxxii. It was in that light 
contended that this could lead to further job creation and training of 
employees. This led the Tribunal to deduce that the merger would have no 
negative consequences for the public interest. The tribunal accepted the 
Commission's representation for unconditional approval of the mergerlxxxiii. 
Ixxvii CASE NO. 21 Large Mergers, MAR 06,Competition Tribunal website 
Ixxviii Case NO.21 supra 
Ixxix Case No.21 supra 
Ixxx Case No.21 supra 
Ixxxi Case No 21 supra 
Ixxxii Case No.21 supra 
Ixxxiii Case No.21 supra 
2.1.7 IMPACT OF MERGER ON EMPLOYEE NUMBERS, LEVELS OF 
SENIORITY THEREOF, SKILL LEVELS AFFECTED AND RELATIVE 
READY RE-EMPLOYABILITY THEREOF IN THE MARKET PLACE 
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In the case of INTERNATIONAL MINERAL RESOURCES AGE ("IMRA") 
AND KERMAS SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) L TDlxxxiv the merger entities 
submitted that the proposed merger "would have an impact on 
employment"IXxxv and that job losses not in excess of "60 employees out of 
900 Bromor employees"lxxxvi. would be affected It was only "the semi-
skilled and skilled employees (i.e. non-manufacturing employees)"lxxxvii that 
would be impacted by "post-merger redundancies"lxxxviii. 
An undertaking on the timelines of such retrenchments was made by the 
merging entities that such retrenchments would be kept in abeyance "for a 
period of at least nine (9) months"lxxxix; further that no measures would be 
taken towards retrenchment readiness, at the least, for a period of "six (6) 
months" xcas calculated from merger implementation date. 
The corporate and social security measures taken in ameliorating the 
impact of the redundancies on a category of affected employees, non of 
whom is unskilled, the time lines when no preparations could even be 
made towards retrenchment implementation and the minimum time delays 
undertaken in the actual implementation of the retrenchments would 
appear to have helped ease the process of approval of this merger.xCi 
Ixxxiv Case NO.03Large Merger June 06 
Ixxxv Case No. 03 supra 
Ixxxvi Case No.03 supra 
Ixxxvii Case No.03 supra 
Ixxxviii Case No.03 supra 
Ixxxix Case No.03 supra 
xc Case No.03 supra 
xci Case No.03 supra 
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The tribunal found that the public interest considerations did not warrant 
the imposition of any conditions. It may well be that the undertakings 
volunteered by the merger entities reduced the probability of the tribunal's 
imposing its own, perhaps more stringent, approval conditionsxcii •. 
What is not settled or even addressed by this judgment, however, is the 
question of, if up to sixty employees out of nine hundred's pending 
redundancy does not raise the tribunal's "eyebrows", how many 
employees' looming retrenchment raises the alarm with the tribunal? Or is 
this perhaps the wrong question? Should the question be how many 
workers of what level of skills and/or of what level of seniority or, for that 
matter juniority, must be at risk of retrenchment for the tribunal to start 
becoming unsettled? 
This case does not purport to address the unacceptable outer limit levels 
of redundancy. Rather, it is submitted; in disclosing that the aforesaid 
levels of redundancy are bearable to the tribunal it flags the question of 
where the diving line lies between the acceptable and the unacceptable 
levels in this regard. 
2.1.8 IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT OF SKILLED EMPLOYEES 
Tendentiously in the vein of the last discussed IMRA case, in the matter of 
PRESTASI BROILERS (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED / THEBE RISK 
SERVICES (PROPRIETARY) LlMITEDxciii we see the Tribunal addressing 
the matter of a projected post merger situation where a relatively small 
number of essentially, "skilled" workersxciv, were to be affected by the 
merger. The tribunal did not consider that to constitute a public interest 
huddle of the magnitude that would warrant either the declining of merger 
xcii Case No 03 supra 
xciii CASE NO. 27/Large Mergers/APR 06,Competion Tribunal website 
xciv Case No 27 supra 
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consent or the granting of it subject to certain conditions relating to the fate 
of the workers so affectedxcv• 
The case jurisprudence developed by the tribunal so far discloses that in a 
number of cases where skilled workers were to be laid off due to a merger 
triggered rationalization the approach of the tribunal has been to counter 
weigh this relatively negative fact against the fact that their superior skills 
compared to the bulk of the (usually lesser skilled) work force of the pre-
merger entities made the blow of their loss of employment that little bit less 
harsh. 
The tribunal has largely tended to entertain the submissions of Counsel 
that ,on average, employees with superior skills had greater leverage in 
the job market in terms of the chances of finding suitable alternative 
employment post merger induced retrenchment. 
This argument, it is with respect contended, is a rather sweeping one and 
does not withstand close scrutiny as the job market is not itself static and 
could be in either a general state of decline at the time of a merger or be 
so in the particular sector(s) or industry where the specialized superior 
skills being laid off would ordinarily be most likely to find alternative 
employment or would be functionally best suited to be re-absorbed into the 
economy. 
A contrary contention would presumably hold out that in a given casuistic 
instance, with proper proof of such dire decline in re-employment 
prospects for a given category of particularly specialized highly skilled 
labour the Tribunal would most probably factor such into its ruling on the 
merger consent application .. 
xcv Case No.27 supra 
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There is no indication, for instance, that In an industry wide decline that 
happens to coincide with the merger application the Tribunal would not 
proceed with appropriate restraint and sensitivity; that it probably would 
not impose approval conditions and the like to ameliorate the dire threat 
therein posed to the employment of such skilled professionals. 
This, incidentally conjures in the author mind's another conceivable 
scenario. Picture a situation where the emergent laying off of certain highly 
specialised professional employees due to a merger in part triggered by 
the need to rationalise and consolidate just for operational survival in the 
face of the prevalence of particularly lean financial times in a given 
industry or sector thereof. 
Were it to be proved on a balance of probabilities that, albeit such 
professionals were being offered most generous retrenchment packages, 
that the only meaningful prospect of their re-employment in their niche 
areas of specialization in the short to medium term during the industry 
slump would be for them to relocate overseas; for their skills to be lost to 
South Africa (possibly permanently). 
Would this be a public interest scenario warranting the Tribunal to impose 
some conditional restraints on such a merger or to even decline consent 
for it? 
Indeed, should merger triggered monumental loss of employment of rare 
skilled South African to overseas countries be a matter that would or 
should warrant the Tribunal to impose judicial restraints to such merger or 
to the manner of its implementation? 
The writer is not aware of any case finalized by or even currently before 
the Tribunal where the nature and parameters of probable re-employability 
have been penetratively examined and defined. 
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Indeed, no case has ever mapped out, for all practical intents and 
purposes, quite how extensive within the scope of section 12 A (3)(b)XCVi of 
the Competition Act is the legal scope of the Tribunal's discretion in the 
imposition of restraints on foreseeable negative merger impact upon 
existing employment. 
This is clearly an unfolding and unfinished matter. It is arguably properly 
one never to ever be completely settled given the diverse combination of 
circumstances in these regards that can manifest before the tribunal for 
determination. 
The Tribunal is ultimately faced with a delicate balancing act between 
making merger approval not too stringent a process and thus stifling the 
natural dynamics of industry and the market place and ensuring on the 
other hand that jobs are not casually disposed of in the highly pressured 
hurly burly world of urgent merger deal closure. 
The tribunal found "no significant public interest issues" and thus 
unconditionally approved this transaction. 
2.1.9 MERGER AFFECTING STATUS OF SOME SENIOR 
MANAGERS, BUT CAUSING NO RETRENCHMENTS 
In the matter of SASOL OIL (PTY) L TO / EXEL PETROLEUM (PTY) 
L TOxcvii it emerged for public interest purposes before the tribunal that the 
expectation was that the merger would cause a handful of minor 
"adjustments" impacting the positions of some members of senior 
management XCViii. This notwithstanding, the merger entities foresaw no 
retrenchments due to the merger consequent "integration" exercise. 
xcvi Brassey and five others 345 
xcvii Case no. 57 Large Mergers Oct 2003,Competition Tribunal website 
xcviii Case NO.57 supra 
The merger was approved unconditionally 
2.1.10 TRIBUNAL'S TREATMENT OF SCENARIO WHERE WORKERS 
HAVE THE CHOICE TO EITHER ACCEPT SEVERANCE PACKAGES 
OR TRANSFER FROM ONE ENTITY TO ANOTHER 
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In the case of VODACOM SERVICES PROVIDER COMPANY 
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED AND VODACOM PROPERTIES NO.2 
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED AND AFRICELL CELLULAR SERVICES 
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED (" AFRICELL,,)XCiX the nub of the merger 
entities' public interest compliance submission on the employment front 
was that Africell's workers would either "transfer to the franchisee" in 
compliance with the Labour Relations Act or such employees would have 
the option to elect to accept "the severance packages" that Africell will 
offer to them"C and that accordingly the merger would not adversely 
influence employment. The Tribunal found that this all made for a neutral 
public interest positionci and approved the merger without conditions. 
2.1.11 MERGER BRINGS PROSPECTS OF RETRENCHMENT 
FOR A HANDFUL OF SKILLED AND SENIOR EMPLOYEES 
In the case of CHEMICAL SERVICES LIMITED AND LEOCHEM 
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED ("LEOCHEM,,)Cii the tribunal did not deem 
unacceptable the level and nature of retrenchments in prospect since only 
three employees, each of them a director of Leochem, faced any risk of 
being retrenchedciii • The tribunal's take on the matter was that since these 
were all "highly skilled persons" the probability of them finding alternative 
xcix Case No.48 Large Mergers June 2006 Competition Tribunal 
c Case No. 48 supra 
ci Case No.48 supra 
cii Case No.1 09 Large Mergers, NOV 05,Competition Tribunal website 
ciii Case No 109 supra 
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employment was high in the event of their being laid offiv and approved 
the merger unconditionally. 
2.1.12 TRANSFER OF EMPLOYEES FROM TARGET FIRM TO ACQUIRING 
FIRM SEEN AS INNOCUOUS FOR PUBLIC INTEREST PURPOSES 
In the matter of PLAASKEM (PTY) LTD ("PLAASKEM") AND UAP 
AGROCHEMICALS KZN (PTY) LTD ("UAP KZN") UAP CROP CARE 
(PTY) L TDcv, the tribunal , having regard to the fact that the entire 
complement of employees of UAP KZN and UAP Cape "would be 
transferred to Plaaskem" and in the absence of any other key public 
interest question, approved the merger unconditionally. 
2.1.13 TRANSFER OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, NO RETRENCHMENTS 
In this case again, to wit, in ENGEN PETROLEUM LIMITED AND FXX 
ON MOBIL SOUTH AFRICA (PROPRIETARY) LlMITEDcvi the tribunal 
positively noted the pending "transfer of employment contracts from EMSA 
to Engen" and this being the only emergent public interest question, 
concurred with the commission's recommendation and approved the 
merger unconditionally. 
2.1.14 NO IMPACT ON JOBS AND EMPLOYMENT 
In this case, the matter of LEXSHELL 676 INVESTMENT 
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED / XSTRATA SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) 
LlMITEDcvii we can observe a typical example of the numerous case 
instances where the Tribunal has not foundcviii the existence of any public 
civ Case No. 109 supra 
cv Case No.78 Large Mergers OCT 2004 
cvi CASE NO. 14 Large Mergers ,NOV 2004,Competition Tribunal website 
cvii CASE NO. 30 Large Mergers APRIL 2006,Competition Tribunal website 
cviii Case No.30 Competition Tribunal website 
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interest issues and where there had simply been no merger sensitive job 
loss issues existing or prospective. The writer has included this case, as it 
were; to represent the plethora of such cases that come before the tribunal 
completely free of issues as to public interest related controversies. 
2.1.15 RETENTION OF ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES POST-MERGER 
FOUND TO BE INNOCUOUS FOR PUBLIC INTEREST PURPOSES 
In NEDBANK LIMITED AND RETAIL BRANDS INTERAFRICA (PTY) 
LTD AND CONTINENTAL BEVERAGES (PTY) LTDcix, employment 
being the only emergent public interest question the tribunal accepted the 
submission of the merger parties that "all Smartcall's current employees"CX 
would be retained and that accordingly the transaction had no adverse 
employment implications. 
2.1.16 BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES OF TARGET FIRM TO BE 
TRANSFERRED TO AN ENTITY OF ACQUIRING FIRM: TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT NOT TO CHANGE: NO PUBLIC 
INTEREST ISSUES 
In the case of COMMERCIAL PROPERTY FINANCE DIVISION OF 
ABSA BANK LUMBARD AND EQUITY ESTATES (PROPRIETARY) 
LlMITEDcxi the tribunal was content in respect to public interest 
considerations that as per the merger entities' submissions the merger 
would not negatively impact employment as "the business of Equity 
Estates" would be "transferred" to MRX together with all with employees 
thereof, whose employment would "continue" under MRX "on the same 
terms and conditions as those of their employment with Equity Estates"cxii. 
eix CASE NO. 71 Large Mergers, DEC 2003 Competition Tribunal website 
ex Case No.71 Large Mergers supra 
exi Case No.17 Large Mergers February,2006 
exii Case No.17 Supra 
2.1.17 PROCESS DYNAMICS CONSIDERATIONS IN TERMS OF 
AFFECTED EMPLOYEES' INVOLVEMENT AND INPUT 
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In the matter of FUJITSU SIEMENS COMPUTERS (HOLDING) BV 
("FSC") AND SIEMENS SERVICES NEW CO (PTY) LlMITEDcxiii we see 
the assumption of a stance by a merger consent litigant, to wit, FSC and 
"its controlling firms, Siemens and Fujitsu that it was significant that they 
did "not directly carryon business in South Africa" but had only an indirect 
presence through their subsidiaries' operationscxiv in the country. 
Due to the non-existence of a trade union at "the Product Related Service 
Business ("PRS business")", an attempt to inform the employees was 
made through the twice-attempted delivery of "a copy of the merger 
notice" on the representative of the workers, a Mr. Groenewald. 
It emerges that the said workers' representative disclosed that the workers 
at PRS business had no inclination to try and challenge approval of the 
merger but were singularly pre-occupied with "conditions of service, 
severance packages and such like labour related concerns"cxv. 
Despite the Commission's requesting the workers' representative to 
formalize the workers' "concerns in writing" up to the date of delivery of the 
judgment such correspondence had not been forthcoming from the said 
representativecxvi. The merger parties submitted that there would be "no 
effect on employment" and the tribunal found no public interest difficulties 
to existCXvii. 
exiii CASE NO.26 Large Mergers, MAR 2006,Competition Tribunal website 
exiv Case NO.26 supra 
exv Case NO.26 supra 
exvi Case No.26 Supra 
cxvii Case No.26 Supra 
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This matter discloses the difficulties that the Tribunal can face where the 
employees affected are not unionized or otherwise organized and where 
there is no formal joining of issue on behalf of the workers before the 
Tribunal. 
The tribunal ends up heavily dependant on what facts the Commission 
could gather, on the probably one-sided perspective of the merging 
entities and on their good faith. In this matter, clearly had the workers 
been properly organized, represented and formally joined issue, their 
concerns would have been made a formal part of the record and perhaps 
the merger might even have been approved subject to the imposition of 
some specific conditions; such conditions as would substantively address 
and secure the relative preservation of their conditions of employment by 
the post merger entity on such terms as would then be meet. 
The contention that there will be no retrenchments post merger, as it is not 
legally binding, even if it turns out to be factual in the future, does not 
guarantee that there will, in fact, be no adverse revisions of the conditions 
of service by the merged entity. 
The tribunal's approach to this matter tends to disclose the reluctance of 
all judicial officers to appear to be descending on to the adversarial floor of 
argument by seemingly overzealously pursuing an issue while the party 
who would presumably be most affected by it is seemingly displaying 
scant interest. 
While the tribunal will in appropriately presented and canvassed matters 
evidently carefully weigh the impact on the public interest, in this matter it 
transmitted firmly the message (to borrow a phrase) that it will not be "an 
agony Aunt" .It will not go out of its way to hunt for details from all the 
workers as to the nitty gritty of how, if at all, their conditions of service are 
likely to be affected by the merger. 
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This is perhaps particularly necessary as the Competition Act gives the 
Commission the prosecutorial role and the Tribunal the judicial one in the 
discharge of the competition authorities' business; arguably the role of 
pursuing these kinds of issues more minutely was for the Commission to 
execute and more vigorously so than it did in this matter. 
Justice Lewis emphasizes the importance of the sound functionality of this 
division of labour as he denotes interalia the need for ". an independent 
and accessible antitrust authority with a clear demarcation between the 
investigative and adjudicative functions .. "cxviii. 
This notwithstanding, at a perhaps purely academic level, one might as 
well ponder whether the tribunal could not, through the powers vested in 
its "presiding member"cxix, of its own motion have caused the workers' 
representative in this matter to be subpoenaed in terms of section 54 (a) 
and (b) and possibly (c) of the Competition Acfxx, which provides wide 
powers to the Tribunal in this regard? 
This, to cause the said workers' representative to orally amplify the 
employees' concerns under oath, thereby also affording the merger parties 
an opportunity to cross examine him and interrogate further any 
misrepresentations to its cause in this regard as might occur? 
Would so doing really have set a dangerous precedent that would 
potentially burden process and unduly fetter the Tribunal's exercise of its 
clearly wide discretion in this regard in the handling of similar matters in 
future? 
exviii Justice Lewis supra, 622 
exix Section 54 of the Competition Act,No890f 1998 as amended 
exx Competition Act, supra 
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It surely cannot even be suggested, or can it be, that the Tribunal 
exercised its discretion in this regard imprudently? Was it not sufficient for 
the Tribunal, to note that the Commission had twice sought the workers' 
representative to submit written submissions to it in this regard? 
Does that, however, not itself beg a question? The question being what if 
the workers' representative in fact was sloppy in relaying the 
Commission's request for the workers' written representations? Would the 
workers' fate in such circumstances be determined by vehicle of a sole 
representative's caprices? so, even if the body of the work force might not 
have had more than a hazy clue at that stage in the merger approval 
process as to what was unfolding on their employment's future? 
Did the fact that the Commission tried to secure such written 
representations assuage the Tribunal's "judicially informed conscience" in 
the exercise of its discretion? This, notwithstanding that the Tribunal 
clearly had not been averse to the attempts the Commission had made to 
obtain the workers' representations? 
Indeed, does the fact that as per the tribunal's own record, up to the date 
of judgment these representations were still anticipated to be received and 
considered as part of the hearing process, not compound the notional 
discomfort flowing from the deciding of the matter without first 
subpoenaing and hearing the workers' representative (and perhaps also 
some of his worker colleagues) under oath? 
Would such said subpoena's issuance on the other not have been the 
striking of a telling blow for employee participation in ensuring that the 
employment aspects of the public interest were not merely skimmed over? 
Would this not help ensure that some more disturbing aspects of the 
matter were not possibly overlooked while lurking just under the seemingly 
mundane surface of the application proceedings? 
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What if some particularly material facts in this regard had simply not come 
to the attention of the Commission and by extension that of the Tribunal? 
This, it could further be contended, is especially sensitively so in a matter 
like this one where non-unionized and (for merger process participation 
purposes, anyway) clearly disorganized workers, coupled with their 
presumably scant litigation financing resources and the merger-seeking 
entities they were facing's bearing the might of two powerful global player 
multinationals? 
In this regard, it would appear, the tribunal's attitude was that any party 
who considered their interests might be at due risk of peril has to duly file 
its papers and appear before the Tribunal as regulated to canvass its 
cause. The Tribunal found the merger to be clear on the public interest 
front and granted its unconditional approvalcxxi. 
2.1.18 THE RELEVANCE OF THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN THE 
MERGER APPROVAL CONSIDERATION PROCESS 
In this case, to wit, AFROX HEALTH CARE LIMITED AND 
AMALGAMATED HOSPITALS LlMITEDcxxii the entities to the merger 
having disclosed that they foresaw no job losses, the Commission 
indicated to the tribunal that it had received "no representations" from the 
unions to which the employees of the merging entities belongedCXxiii. 
The wording of the Tribunal's judgment after observing that there were no 
representations from unions, that". Accordingly no public interest concerns 
arise from the merger"CXXiV, interpreted casually, implicitly betray a notion 
that if the unions do not raise public interest issues then none can arise or 
none do arise. That surely would fly in the face of the Competition Act's 
cxxi Case No.26 supra 
cxxii CASE NO. 53/LM/SEP 01 ,Competition Tribunal website 
cxxiii Case No.53 supra 
cxxiv Case No.53 supra 
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own terms and spirit in respect to public interest issues, their relatively 
wide scope and sources. 
In the nature of the typically adversarial relationship between corporate 
employer and Union and with the protection of workers' rights and 
interests' falling naturally in the domain of the Union, such words do tend 
to underline that no representations from the appropriate Union(s) could 
well be perceived, albeit wrongly so in certain circumstances, as meaning 
more particularly that no employment related public interest issues are in 
view. 
We have noted and are yet to encounter in this report repeat instances 
where the relevant union has fallen particularly short of the mark in 
providing swift, informed, exemplarily interventionist and "pursue matter to 
the finish "type leadership in matters that have come before the tribunal, 
where union membership's interests were at risk? 
2.1.19 THE ROLE OF UNION IN INFLUENCING TREATMENT BY 
TRIBUNAL OF CONCERNS REGARDING POSSIBLE 
RETRENCHMENT OF WORKERS POST-MERGER 
In BID INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD AND G. FOX AND 
COMPANY (PTY) LlMITEDcXXV the Union SACTWU presented its 
concerns to the tribunal pertaining to "continued employment of G. Fox's 
employees subsequent to the merger"CXXVi. This, in the light of the non-
existence of a definite commitment from the merger parties in respect "to 
possible retrenchments" consequent to the mergerCXXVii. 
exxv Case No.53 supra 
exxvi Case No.53 supra 
exxvii Case No58 supra 
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In the absence of such a concrete undertaking, in the Union' view the 
merged entity's hand would be unfettered and it could retrench as it 
desired upon the approval of the merger by the competition authorities. 
The Commission sought and obtained from the merger entities a 
commitment that "no unionized employees would be retrenched for a 
period of 18 months from the effective date as a result of the merger"Cxxviii 
Bid Industrial, however, qualified its undertaking with the cautionary note 
that in the eventuality of unanticipated developments beyond "its control 
and unrelated to the merger" in the nature, for instance, of an 
unforeseeable "downturn in the market in which G. Fox operates"Cxxix then 
Bid Industrial would in any event be forced to take such steps 
(retrenchments included, as the circumstances may dictate) as would be 
in the optimum "interests of the business"cxxxThis, so as to secure the 
survival and longevity of the business. The Commission's perspective was 
that these qualified undertakings should allay the union's said fearscxxxi. 
Only a day prior to the hearing the trade union sent the tribunal a letter 
soliciting approval of the pending merger application strictly subject to the 
stipulation that that no retrenchments should be effected for a minimum 
period of 24 monthsCxxxii. 
A number of procedural shortcomings did not help the union's cause 
before the tribunal, as it did not appear to submit any "oral submissions" 
and motivate its letter borne submissions. It merely affirmed that its said 
correspondence made out a "formal submission to the hearing"CXxxiii. 
exxviii Case No 58 supra 
exxix Case No.58 supra 
exxx Case No.58 supra 
exxxi Case No.58 supra 
exxxii Case No.58 supra 
exxxiii Case No.58 supra 
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On the face of such correspondence, the tribunal found no evidential basis 
for finding that the merger itself would trigger retrenchments of some 
personsCxXXiV .. 
In addition, the merging parties made a "good faith" undertaking that they 
would not retrench unionized employees for a period of eighteen (18) 
months from the date of approval of this merger by the Competition 
Tribunalcxxxv. 
The Tribunal concluded that the said undertaking made by the merging 
entities provided adequate safeguards in this regard, most particularly as 
there was no real evidence that any retrenchments would be caused by 
this merger in the first place. Unconditional merger consent was granted 
hereincxxxvi 
2.1.20 THE ROLE OF UNIONS: MERGER BACKGROUD OF SIGNIFICANT 
HISTORICAL REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF EMPLOYEES 
In the matter of LNM HOLDINGS MV AND ISCOR LlMITEDcxxxvii the 
tribunal heard representations from two of Iscor's unions, Solidarity and 
the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa). Their 
concerns were informed by the historical backdrop whereby employment 
levels had dwindled sharply in the last few years at ISCOR allegedly "from 
44 000 in 1980 to 12 200 in 2004,.cxxxviii, according to the Unions' 
submissions. 
exxxiv Case No.58 supra 
exxxv Case NO.58 supra 
exxxvi Case No 58 supra 
exxxvii CASE NO.08/LM/FEB 04,Competition Tribunal website 
exxxviii CASE NO.8 supra 
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The bulk of these jobs, according to the Unions, had ceased to exist 
"between 1980 and 1997," accordingly predating the year 2002 when LNM 
acquired "its first investment in Iscor"cxxxix 
The Unions were at one in asserting that LNM had the reputation of "a job 
cutter" and that it was well known to cut wages readily as part of its 
"miracle" turn around strategyCxl .. 
LNM strenuously denied these charges and submitted that it enjoyed 
positive relations with unions when it had taken over .It submitted interalia 
that the unions had not succeeded in exhibiting a link between the job 
losses and the purposes of LNMcx1i . 
After much deliberation on employment and the related issues, the tribunal 
formed the view that there were no direct plans to turn away from "existing 
Iscor Policies,,c;xlii. 
As has already manifested in this report, a common thread in the 
Tribunal's body of case law is the relative inadequacies of organized and 
non-organized labour's submissions to the Tribunal, which emerges in this 
case as well. Neither of the two Unions affected herein made or even 
offered to make "any oral" submissions in this hearing, opting instead to 
bank on their basic written representations. 
As a consequence the tribunal ended up faced with a glaring evidential 
and adversarial process gap in the proceedings in that LNM's 
representations on the employment related matters went unrefuted. The 
tribunal sums up the difficulties this created in stating in its decision 
interalia that the Unions' non-attendance at the hearing "did not make their 
exxxix Case No.8 supra 
exl Case NO.8 supra 
exli Case No.8supra 
exlii Case No.8 supra 
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case any stronger". Clearly a courteous understatement of the dire 
consequences of such neglect of due process for the Unions' cause. 
What remains a mystery to the writer is that the Unions must surely have 
been aware that because of the massive financial and strategic stakes for 
the merging entities, coupled with their capacity to afford and their 
predictable non hesitation to secure the finest legal counsel they could 
secure for such crucial proceedings, even if the Unions could not afford to 
pay legal counsel to properly represent them at such hearing, they could 
have, at least sent a senior Union official to the hearing to amplify and 
maintain the resilience of the Union's cause as best he knew how?!! 
As aforesaid this sad reality is compounded by the trend that emerges in 
the tribunal's body of case law where repeatedly Unions have not onlyCXliii 
failed to appear at the hearing, but have manifestly placed their faith in no 
more than a simple letter sent to the Tribunal stating their grievances. . 
No specific effect "on employment policy" at Iscor was found to exist by 
the tribunal nor any other adverse impact on the "public interest" that is 
protected in terms of the Act. The merger was approved 
u ncond itio nallyCXliv. 
2.2 THE TREATMENT BY THE TRIBUNAL OF A PUBLIC INTEREST 
SCENARIO WHERE JOBS WOULD PROBABLY BE LOST WHETHER 
THE MERGER WAS APPROVED OR NOT 
In the matter of BOART LONG YEAR (A DIVISION OF ANGLO 
OPERATING), HUDDY (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED AND HUDDY ROCK 
TOOLS (PTY) L TDcx1v something of a Hobson's choice confronted the 
exliii CASE NO.8 supra 
exliv CASE NO 8 supra 
exlv CASE N0.41 ILMN AUG 03,Competition Tribunal website 
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Tribunal in that from a scenario of the likely loss of about 145 jobs if the 
merger were permitted, non approval of the merger would leave the status 
about as negative," 120 jobs would nevertheless be lost if the merger 
were not approvedcxlvi 
The tribunal also had to contend with the reality that Soart's Springs plant 
had to acquire increased volumes that were realizable purely by means of 
the merger for it to continue operating viablyCXlvii. Accordingly, if merger 
approval were to be declined Soart's coring division would in all probability 
be relocated beyond South Africa, to a sister plant thereof in the United 
States of Americacxlviii. 
Moreover Huddy contended that failing the merger, it would necessarily 
have to cease manufacturing operations and would have to become 
merely a distribution firm with further negative consequences for 
employment levelscxlix .. 
The tribunal was quite concerned that in the light of the "global dynamic of 
the industry" bar the merger, both Soart and Huddy would abandon some 
of their manufacturing activities in South Africa. It took keen note of the 
fact that jobs were on the line either way as declined merger consent on 
the public interest grounds of trying to prevent the loss of jobs would 
nevertheless precipitate the "unintended" effect of worsening the very loss 
of employmentC1 .. 
cxlvi Case No 41 supra 
cxlvii Case no.41 supra 
cxlviii Case No.41 supra 
cxlix Case N0.41 supra 
cl Case No 41 supra 
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The Tribunal ended up concluding that approval of the merger subject to 
certain conditions was the lesser of the two evils in the quest to lessen the 
run on jobs in the circumstancesc1i . 
This case also bears out two other interesting dimensions; "the failing firm" 
characteristic and the characteristic of non merger approval "limiting the 
competitiveness of a firm in foreign markets" which are discussed below ... 
2.2.1 POST-MERGER DETERMINATION OF MERGER CONSENT 
APPLICATION; EMERGENT LABOUR ISSUES CONSEQUENT AND 
CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE CRIMINAL SANCTION FOR 
PROCEEDING WITH LARGE MERGER WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL 
THEREOF BY THE TRIBUNAL 
In the matter of NEDBANK LIMITED/RETAIL BRANDS INTERAFRICA 
(PTY) LTD AND CONTINENTAL BEVERAGES (PROPRIETARY) 
LlMITEDc1ii in so far as the public interest relates to jobs, this is a "water 
under the bridge" type situation as the merger, which was implemented in 
2000 without merger approval, had impacted employees of the target firms 
post merger, with significant retrenchments taking placecliii . 
The merger entities submitted that the said retrenchments were effected 
in order to reduce costs in a rescue exercise by Nedbank to try and secure 
the survival of the target firms from liquidation. It was submitted that but for 
this exercise, some jobs would have been lost anywat'iV. 
eli Case No.41 supra 
clii CASE NO. 71 ,Large Merger DEC 2003,Competion Tribunal website 
eliii Case No.71 supra 
eliv Case NO.71 Supra 
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The Commission was of the view that the retrenchments highlighted some 
serious public interest issuesc1v. Nevertheless, as the merger was 
implemented 25 months prior to the determination of the matter by the 
Tribunal, the Commission recommended that the retrenchment should be 
cited as an "an aggravating circumstance"clvi in the eventuality that the 
merger parties were prosecuted for effecting the merger without 
possessing the requisite regulatory authorization. 
This, of course, begs the question of why the Commission was not laying 
such charges itself instead of merely recommending a sanction on a 
speculative basis with the lapse of the said 25 months since merger 
implementation the employment issue became largely of academic 
interest for public interest purposes. It is quite ironic that though there 
clearly had been significant employment related public interest issues at 
the time of the merger implementation, the tribunal had no choice but to 
conclude that there were no public interest issues pending as at the time 
of the decision itself clvii. 
2.2.2 POSITIVE TURNAROUND AT HEARING ON ISSUE OF 
ANTICIPATED MERGER SPECIFIC JOB LOSSES 
In the matter of ADCOCK INGRAM (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED AND THE 
SCIENTIFIC GROUP (PTY) LTD AND SCIENTIFIC GROUP 
INVESTMENTS (PTY) L TDclviii at the hearing the merger entities moved 
away from their previous stance that at the most 20 employees might face 
retrenchment They submitted to the Tribunal that "no jobs" would be 
elv Case No.71 Supra 
c1vi Case No.71 Supra 
elvii Case No.71 Supra 
elviii CASE NO. 20Large Mergers, AUG 2005,Competition Tribunal website 
45 
affected as a consequence of the merger after allclix. There being no other 
public interest issues the merger was approved unconditionalllx. 
2.2.3 RETRENCHMENTS OF A FEW LIKELY TO RESULT FROM 
"DUPLICATION OF SERVICES" DUE TO MERGER 
In the case of SANTAM LTD I KAGISO TRUST AND NOVA GROUP 
HOLDINGS L TDc1xi the parties to the merger disclosed that seven (7) 
employees would be impacted by the merger due to "duplication of 
services within Nova Group and Santam"clxii. 
It was submitted in support of the merger that these employees were 
particularly marketable in "the financial sector" and would most probably 
locate alternative employmentCIXiii. 
This turned around eventually as the merging entities made a declaration 
at the hearing that the impacted workers would not exceed five (5) and 
that an endeavour to subsume that five into Santa would be made. 
The merger entities further submitted that the deal was pro-BEE as it 
facilitated the opening up of an opportunity for Kais Trust, a leading 
empowerment investment banking services group, to secure shares in the 
insurance industry. 
The Tribunal did not make much of the BEE driven submissions, but 
nevertheless found no public interest difficulties with the application and 
granted the merger consent unconditionally. 
elix Case No.20 supra 
elx Case No.20 supra 
elxi Case No. Case No.32 Large Merger, May 2005 Competition Tribunal 
elxii Case No. 32 supra 
elxiii CASE No. 32supra 
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2.2.4 UPFRONT UNION INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE 
MERGER PARTIES WITH THE COMMISSION, ESPECIALLY OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT IMPACTING ASPECTS CAN HELP SPEED UP THE 
HEARING AT THE TRIBUNAL AND CONCOMMITANTL Y REDUCE THE 
COSTS OF LITIGATION 
In the LONMIN PLC AND SOUTHERN PLATINUM CORpclxiv matter, it 
was submitted that the financial health of the Messina mining operations 
was in a desperate state and that unless the merger was allowed; in the 
region of 1532 jobs could be lost at the operation. 
It was submitted that if the merger were approved, with Lonmin's 
involvement, the number of retrenchments could be substantially reduced 
and in the region of "284 semi-skilled workers and 116 workers at 
management, artisan, supervisor and administrator levels might be 
retrenched" if the worst were to occurc1xv. 
The merger entities submitted that the projected retrenchments were due 
to a necessary operational adjustment to a less dangerous mining 
methodology, restructured operational timetable and the rationalization of 
a prohibitive operational cost structure. It was disclosed to the tribunal that 
in excess of 60% of the pre-merger cost structure at Messina was 
employment relatedClxvi. 
Due to a lingering concern on the Commission's part that the said 
retrenchments were still too high, some conditions of approval were 
negotiated and agreed together with the merger entities? 
c1xiv Case No.41 Large Mergers, May,2005,Competition Tribunal 
c1xv Case No 41 supra 
c1xvi Case No 41 supra 
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The one emergent difficulty was that the Unions acting on behalf of the 
employees at Messina Mine had not been at all involved in the preparation 
of the proposed conditions of approval. 
To resolve this impasse, the Tribunal requested the merger parties to 
transmit copies of the Commission's conditional approval proposals to all 
the affected Unions for them to ponder and make representations in this 
regard. 
Correspondence was eventually furnished to the Tribunal disclosing the 
Unions' acceptance of the mooted merger conditions of approvalclxvii. 
At the Tribunal's insistence the Unions were represented at the hearing 
and they re-affirmed the acceptability of the conditionsclxviii. 
The merger was eventually approved subject to such agreed conditions. 
These conditions included interalia i) the consolidation of total 
retrenchment numbers generally and sectionally among the different skill 
levels and skill categories of workers, ii) the short listing of a minimum of a 
quarter of the job positions that would become available at Lonhim (or 
somewhere else within the merged entity group) for the amelioration of 
actual retrenchment levels. Alternative skills training for retrenched 
workers were also stipulated as an approval condition It was ordered that 
the same should be effected before retrenchments actually occurred. 
The conditions were to remain in force for a period of 24 months from the 
issuance "of the clearance certificate by the Competition Tribunal". 
The merger was conditionally so approved 
clxvii Case No.41 supra 
clxviii Case No.41 supra 
2.2.5 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AS A SEPARATE DISTINCT 
BUSINESS: RETRENCHMENTS NOT TO RESULT 
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In MOMENTUM GROUP LIMITED AND BONHEUR 94 GENERAL 
TRADING (PTY) LTD the Tribunal was satisfied with the submissions of 
the merger parties that the merger would not precipitate any 
retrenchments, since the business of Sovereign would preserve its 
operational status "as a separate discreet business". The merger was 
approved unconditionally. 
2.2.6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT PERTAINING 
TO RETRENCHMENTS MADE PART OF COURT ORDER 
In MUL TICHOICE SUBSCRIBER MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD 
("MUL TICHOICE")ITISCALL (PTY) L TDclxix the tribunal stipulated a 
condition in respect to the retrenchment of employees. This condition 
stemmed not from "the hearings" but from an agreement entered into 
between "the merged entity and their employees as part of their collective 
bargaining". 
In imposing such condition, the Tribunal pursued the route adopted in "a 
previous merger", in respect to abiding by the terms of an agreement 
already concluded "between employees and employer". The merger was 
approved subject to certain conditions. 
Here we see the Tribunal not only respecting but also actively enforcing a 
pre-existing agreement between employer and employees. 
c1xix Case no. 28 April 2004, Large Mergers, Competition Tribunal website 
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Even though the judgment does not state it in so many word, this is 
presumably in keeping with the important limitation to the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction enshrined in section 3(1 )(b) of the Competition Act which 
excludes "a collective agreement", as defined in section 213 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 ... "clxx 
2.2.7 PRE-EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
ENFORCEABLE WITHOUT TRIBUNAL HAVING TO IMPOSE AN 
"ENABLING" ENFORCEMENT CONDITION IN THAT REGARD 
In the INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA("IDC") AND PRILLA 2000 (PTY) LlMITEDclxxi matter the 
Tribunal declined SACTWU' s request for the imposition of a condition to 
approve the merger subject to IDC's being compelled to "abide by any 
agreements with the National Textile Bargaining Council". 
The tribunal accepted the Competition Commission's perspective that "a 
condition to this effect is unnecessary, since the merger doesn't alter the 
validity or enforceability of this agreement/s with the National Textile 
Bargaining Council". 
The Tribunal's difficulty was imposing by court order the terms of an 
agreement that had been concluded in a separate labour law process and 
as the terms of such agreements had not been hammered out in the 
merger approval process itself. This notwithstanding the fact that 
retrenchment considerations are relevant in competition law in the 
determination of public interest issues. 
c1xx Brassey and 5 others supra 341 
c1xxi Case NO. 72 Large Merger SEP 2004,Competition Tribunal website 
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It is quite interesting to contrast this case with the immediately preceding 
one above, where the tribunal was willing to go in the opposite direction in 
materially similar circumstances. In both instances the agreements did not 
arise inherently from the merger hearing proceedings but from separate 
collective bargaining under the ambit of the Labour Relations Act. 
While in both cases presumably influenced by a keen awareness of the 
dictates of the said limitation to its jurisdiction in terms of Section 3(1 )(b) of 
the Competition Act as read with Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 
has the Tribunal here nevertheless exposed itself to the accusation that it 
has so proceeded in a manner that leaves no discernible or consistent trail 
of precedent; 
That effectively it either positively enforces such collective agreements by 
judicial sanction through the imposition of a condition for them to be 
abided with or by refusing to have anything to do with collective 
agreements and, importantly, somewhat ambivalently and confusingly so? 
As the Tribunal does not in either of these cases specifically cite the said 
Section 3(1 )(b) of the Competition Act as read with Section 213 of the 
Labour Relations Act, it would perhaps be imprudent, on these facts to 
explore this aspect any further. 
2.2.8 EMPLOYEES NOT PROPERLY INFORMED OF 
MERGER CONSEQUENCES: PROCESS ISSUE 
In LIBERTY GROUP LIMITED AND CAPITAL ALLIANCE HOLDINGS 
(PTY) LlMITEDclxxii where it appeared to the court that the employees of 
the affected firms had not been properly informed of the retrenchment 
implications of the proposed merger, the tribunal directed that the merger 
clxxii CASE NO. 04/LARGE MERGERS, JAN, 2005 COMPETITION TRIBUNAL WEBSITE, 
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entities should "give an undertaking that they would address the 
employees' concerns "before the merger order was issued"clxxiii. 
This occurred after some employees had written, following a directive of 
the tribunal to the merger entities to write to their employees and give 
them "the worst case scenario" in respect to possible retrenchments post 
mergerCIXXiV. 
The merger was conditionally so approved. 
2.2.9 BUSINESS ACQUIRED AS A GOING CONCERN: HENCE 
NO UNTOWARD IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT 
In CLiDENT NO.533 (PTY) LTD ("CLIDENT")/EFY APPLIANCES LTD 
AND OTHERS clxxv the tribunal accepted the merging parties' contention 
that inasmuch as the business being sold would be taken over as "a going 
concern" no real difficulties were foreseeable in respect to employment. 
There being no other public interest issues burdening the matter, the 
merger was approved unconditionally. 
2.2.10 DIVISION TAKEN OVER AS A GOING CONCERN: 
NO PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUES 
In ALEXANDER FORBES GROUP (PTY) LTD ("ALEX") AND 
PERSETEL Q DATA TRADING (PTY) L TDclxxvi the tribunal was content 
that no public interest difficulties were in point as by pre-existing 
agreement "Alexander Forbes took over the whole division of 
Remuneration Consulting Surveys without change in personnel". 
elxxiii Case NO 4 SUPRA 
elxxiv Case No.4 SUPRA 
elm CASE NO. 88LARGE MERGERS OCT 2004,Cmpetition Law Tribunal website 
elxxvi CASE NO. 84LARGE MERGERS OCT 2004,Competition Law Tribunal website 
In addition, in any event "the division of PO Data acquired by Alexander 
Forbes had already been sold". 
2.2.11 BUSINESS ACQUIRED AS A GOING CONCERN: NO 
SUBMISSION FROM UNIONS: NO PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUES 
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In IMPERIAL HOLDINGS ("IMPERIAL") AND MURNAU HOLDINGS 
(PTY) LTDclxxvii as the business of Murnau we see that as the business is 
sold and bought "as a going concern, it is not envisaged that there will be 
any job losses as a result of the merger". The tribunal was content that 
there were no public interest issues. Again in this matter no submissions 
were sent in by the registered trade unions on the workers' behalf. 
On a separate note, in the ClidentCIXxviii and Alex cases immediately 
consecutively preceding this matter and indeed, in this matter, we can see 
how the merger structure and 'transition vehicle" employed in each case 
were found by the tribunal to have the common thread of having 
absolutely no impact on employment and hence no public interest issues 
arose on that front. Indeed, no other public interest issues arose in these 
matters and they were all easily approved by the Tribunal. 
2.2.12 STRUCTURE OF DEAL TO ASSUME THE FORM OF SALE 
OF SHARES RESULTING IN NO PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUES 
In BIDVEST GROUP LUMBARD AND VOL TEX HOLDINGS 
LUMBARDclxxix the Tribunal accepted the submissions that since the 
matter assumed the form of "a sale of shares", it would have no negative 
effect on employment - as none of the operating entities of the merging 
clxxvii Case No. 16,Large Mergers, March 2002,Competition Tribunal 
clxxviii Case No 16 supra 
clxxixCase no.1 0 Large Merger Feb 2002 Large Merger, 
,Competition tribunal website 
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parties would layoff any workers merger specifically. No substantial public 
interest issues arise from the merger. 
2.2.13 STRUCTURE OF DEAL TO ASSUME THE FORM OF SALE 
OF SHARES RESULTING IN NO PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUES 
In BIDVEST GROUP LUMBARD AND VOL TEX HOLDINGS 
LUMBARDclxxx the Tribunal accepted the submissions that since the 
matter assumed the form of "a sale of shares", it would have no negative 
effect on employment - as none of the operating entities of the merging 
parties would layoff any workers merger specifically. I t was found by the 
Tribunal that no substantial public interest issues arose from the merger. 
The three immediately preceding cases, the Clident, Alex and Imperial 
cases make for an interesting comparison with the present case. In all four 
cases the deal structure itself was designed so as not to affect jobs at all 
with the subtle nuance in this one being that instead of the transfer of the 
work force from one entity to another or the sale of the business of the 
target entity as a going concern (with its employees) there was a transfer 
of equity shareholding achieving the same result. 
2.2.14 NO MERGER SPECIFIC LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT 
In NEDCOR INVESTMENT BANK HOLDINGS LIMITED AND 
TEMPLETON NIB ASSET MAYCRAT (PTY) LlMITEDclxxxi the transaction 
was not to result in any retrenchments whereas in the second transaction 
where job losses were expected these were to be due mainly to the 
"overall restructuring within the Nedcor Group". 
elxxx Case No. 10 large Mergers, March 2002,Competion Tribunal website 
c1xxxi Case no.86 and 87/1arge mergers Dec 2002,Competition Tribunal website 
54 
Possibly 18 jobs were to be lost as a direct consequence of the "current 
transactions". The tribunal agreed that that this number was relatively 
insignificant when contrasted with the number of jobs to be retained and 
the transaction was accordingly approved unconditionally. 
2.2.15 MERGER POSITIVE FOR EMPLOYMENT: TO EXTEND LIFE OF 
MINE AND TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NEW JOBS 
In this matter, of AQUARIUS PLATINUM (SOUTH AFRICA) (PTY) 
LTD/RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MUSS LIMITED AND ACQUIRES 
PLATINUM (SA) (PTY) LTD IRUSTENBURG PLATINUMclxxxii : the 
tribunal accepted the parties' projection that the merger would facilitate a 
material extension of the operational life of the Roundel mine, which 
clearly helped secure job prospects for a longer period. Moreover it 
transpired that the merger would enable "the creation" of in the region of 
100 new job opportunities. 
The Tribunal noted that public interest considerations, to the degree that 
any had been in issue relating to employment, had been favorable to the 
approval of the merger and the merger was accordingly approved "without 
any conditions". 
2.2.16 EMPLOYMENT LOSS DUE TO MERGER MINIMAL DUE TO 
EMPLOYEES HAVING SECURED ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT 
WHEN MERGER TARGET FIRM CEASED TO OPERATE 
In HIGHVELD STEEL AND VANADIUM CORPORATION LTD, VAN 
LEER SOUTH AFRICA AND STEELBANK MERCHANTS (PTY) LTD TI A 
DRUMPAKclxxxiii it emerged to the tribunal that in some respects public 
interest considerations had been overtaken by events as, the majority of 
clxxxii Case No.75 Large Mergers July,2003 
clxxxiii Case Number 06 Large Mergers Oct 1999,Competition Tribunal website 
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the would have been affected employees had since been found other 
employment. Job losses were accordingly going to be quite negligible. In 
the event the Tribunal allowed the merger to be effected unconditionally. 
(ii) PART "B" 
3.0 "THE ABILITY OF SMALL BUSINESS, OR FIRMS CONTROLLED OR 
OWNED BY HISTORICALLY DISDVANTAGED PERSONS, TO 
BECOME COMPETITIVE" 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
"Historically disadvantaged persons" is defined in section 3(2) of the 
Competition Act as follows: "For all purposes of this Act a person is a 
historically disadvantaged person if that person -
a) is one of a category of individuals who, before the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993), came into 
operation, were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the 
basis of race; 
b) is an association, a majority of whose members are individuals 
referred to in paragraph (a); 
c) is a juristic person other than an association, and individuals 
referred to in paragraph (a), own and control a majority of its issued 
share capital or members' interest and are able to control a majority 
of its votes; or 
d) is a juristic person or association, and persons referred to in 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c) own and control a majority of its issued 
share capital or members' interest and are able to control a 
majority of its votes."clxxxiv 
c1xxxiv Brassey and five others 341 
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"Small firm" is defined in the definitions and interpretation section of the 
Competition Act (section 1 thereof) as having the meaning:" set out in 
the National Small business Act, 1996 (Act 102 of 1996)"clxxxv. 
Possibly because Counsel relieve the court of the burden of having to 
decide such questions by pre-agreeing them before hearing 
proceedings commence, the author in his research of Tribunal case 
jurisprudence has not encountered a matter where the question had to 
be decided upon whether an entity in the presenting facts before the 
Tribunal constituted a "small business", within the meaning 
contemplated by the Competition Act. 
"Black Economic Empowerment" is neither employed as such nor does the 
Competition Act interpret it. Its spirit is nevertheless a much pervading 
theme in those matters before the tribunal that impacted or turned on 
"historically disadvantaged persons" as shall be seen below. 
3.1 BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ("BEE") CONSIDERATIONS: 
INCREASE OF OWNERSHIP OF PREVIOUSLY DISADVANTAGED 
PERSONS 
In TSEBO OUTSOURCING GROUP (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED AND 
DRAKE & SCULL FM (SA) (PTY) L TDclxxxvi on the public interest front the 
Tribunal definitively found that the transaction increased "the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons" and there being no other 
significant public interest issues approved the merger unconditionallyCIXXXVii 
cluxv Brassey and five others 340 
clxxxvi CASE NO. 25 Large Merger, APR 2004 Competition Tribunal website 
clxxxvii Case no 25 Competition Tribunal website 
3.2 THE DYNAMICS OF BEE AS PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUE NOT 
CRITICAL TO ADDRESS ONCE DETERMINATION MADE THAT 
MERGER IN CASU DOES NOT AFFECT COMPETITION 
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In ENGEN PETROLEUM LIMITED VS ZENEX OIL (PROPRIETARY) 
LlMITEDclxxxviii notwithstanding that black economic empowerment was 
invoked as a public interest dynamic of this transaction, the Tribunal took 
the view that as the merger did not affect competition, the matter of 
addressing black economic empowerment dimension did not even have to 
be addressedclxxxix. 
A noteworthy process dynamic here is that were the case in the reverse 
order, this principle would certainly not be applied. Bearing in mind the 
flavour of its jurisprudence to date on the importance of market efficiency 
in mergers, it is simply inconceivable to observe the tribunal passing over 
averments and submissions about materially anticompetitive behavior in 
any matter. 
That since the public interest case was so robust in a given matter; market 
efficiency did not need to be considered at all. To place this aspect further 
into perspective, the public interest considerations that were being 
mooted, if we can rely entirely on the averments of the merger entitiescxc 
were, in any event, positive ones and nothing, for instance, anywhere near 
"massive merger specific retrenchments". 
The Author agonized much over with the approach to simply dispense with 
the consideration of a public interest consideration, to wit, in this case 
BEE, purely because the market efficiency case was positive for the 
merger. 
clxxxviii Case No.26 Large Merger ,DEC 1999 Competition Tribunal website 
clxxxix Case No.26 supra 
cxc Which matter as we shall see below may be more vexed than that. 
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Indeed, as the "loop clearance" process goes in statute driven practice, 
public interest issues are not even considered until the market efficiency 
question is addressed. 
The author now wonders, however, whether in the light of the approach in 
this case the tribunal can, with respect, be said to have somewhat written 
in a "casuistic/ judicial" proviso to section 12 A of the Competition Act in 
relation to public interest issues. A discretion creating type proviso 
perhaps qualifying the provision in such Act making for the secondary 
consideration of public interest issues that reads something like "provided 
the tribunal; may dispense with the consideration of public interest issues 
if it deems it unnecessary in the circumstances of any case"? 
In terms of section 12A (1) of the Competition Act, does the tribunal, as a 
matter of law and legal compliance, not have to put each merger matter 
through the "double loop' acid test of soundness in respect to market 
efficiency and of its impact on the public interest criteria front? Are both of 
these "loops" not specifically enunciated as peremptory to be effected in 
terms of this particular provision? 
Do not the words in Section 12 A (1) of the Competition Act, in respect to 
the market efficiency determination process, to the effect that the Tribunal 
must "initially determine"cxci not implicitly themselves suggest that a 
secondary or "subsequent" analysis, to wit, the public interest dynamic, is 
automatically to follow. 
Indeed, the words in Section 12 A (b) of the Competition Act, providing 
that the Tribunal should,"(b) otherwise determine whether the merger can 
or can not be justified on substantial public interest grounds by assessing 
the factors set out in sub section (3)" are the enabling text for loop 2 of the 
cxci Brassey and five others, 34Ssupra 
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process, loop 1 having been facilitated by the preceding sub section 
thereof starting with the letter (a). Notwithstanding the use of the word 
"otherwise" which is potentially misleading on a shallow reading of the said 
sub section 12 A(b),a careful reading of the so called 2 "loops" of such 
section 12 A discloses a process of phased analysis and not one of 
alternative analysis. 
The writer is by no means suggesting that even a particular category of 
public interest contemplated by the said provision that is quite manifestly 
not occasioned by the facts should be looked into perfunctorily just for 
purposes of cold, formal, "go through the motions" type statutory 
compliance. 
What is contemplated is a matter like this one, where the merger entities 
specifically presented a certain public interest issue as a key and material 
consideration in their merger consent application, that there was a 
significant. Black economic empowerment dimension to the mooted 
merger entity superstructure. 
Equally weighty in its potency herein is the fact that neither the 
Commission in its submissions to the Tribunal nor the court itself in its 
findings ever even suggested that the said mooted BEE dynamic was not 
material or significant in its nature or import The reason for this could be 
that there is no indication in this matter that the enquiry into the BEE 
submissions of the merger entities was ever in earnest made at all a 
"second loop" phase process .. 
It would appear that the tribunal took the simple view that since the said 
BEE considerations were not going to alter its inclination to allow the 
merger, then considering the same amounted virtually to a waste of the 
court's time. 
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If that were, indeed, the underlying thinking then the niggling aspect is how 
could the court have decided to allow a merger having only gone through 
one of the two statutory loops of merger analysis clearly contemplated by 
the Competition Act? 
Indeed, if this were a fiercely contested matter, would an appeal not be 
competent on the simple point of law that the court had totally neglected 
taking the matter through one of the two imperative legs of merger 
analysis? . 
The obvious argument against such an appeal would be that the would be 
appellant's case would not have been advanced by a finding that accepted 
the merger entities' submission that the merger were positive for black 
economic empowerment, as that would only have strengthened the court's 
resolve to approve the merger. Then again that would proceed on the 
premise of an assumption, to wit, that having made a proper inquiry into 
the BEE considerations the court would found them, indeed positive for 
BEE. Is that, however, necessarily true in every such case? 
Surely the primary question remains .Is the election not to consider a 
specifically averred and evidentially documented public interest dimension 
a matter within the judicial discretion of the court or a matter of 
fundamental and absolute peremptory legal compliance? 
Is it of the essence of the merger approval process or a matter the tribunal 
can dispense with in an absolute or qualified judicial discretion? 
The author's view is firmly that this is of the essence of the merger 
analysis process and that there is, with respect, no discretion given to the 
tribunal in this regard. 
61 
Parliament in framing the said section 12A(3) of the Competition Act and 
its aforesaid linking sister provisions in respect to public interest 
considerations surely firmly guarded against making the determination of 
the same at all a matter of judicial discretion. 
Were the question of whether the public interest was considered or not in 
a given matter a matter for judicial discretion then in practice the way case 
law in this regard would develop would resolve itself in a major way into a 
matter of the jurisprudential hue of the particular panel of the tribunal 
considering a given matter. 
It would assuredly encourage "tribunal panel shopping" of sorts by 
Counsel for the litigants, with merging entities with a particularly awkward 
matter from a public interest stand point possibly tempted to maneuver 
and have their matter heard by a panel of the tribunal that might generally 
not be particularly well disposed to the whole doctrinal notion of "the public 
interest". This, if it were to occur, would be a distinct negative for the 
development of South Africa's competition jurisprudence. 
As to whether or not to treat of public interest considerations as distinct 
from those of buttressed ,peremptory ,entrenched and absolute legal 
compliance. 
In the author's view, once the market efficiency loop of the analysis 
process has been cleared, at the very least, a preliminary inquiry into 
whether or not there are any public interest considerations emergent on 
the facts must ensue. Once it emerges from such preliminary inquiry that 
there are indications that (a) certain significant public interest 
consideration(s) is (or are) even apparently emergent, then the tribunal 
has to enquire into and determine the same in earnest. 
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What is the point of doing such if and when it will not alter the decision of 
the tribunal anyway? 
Two reasons. 
First and foremost the Tribunal does not know what the outcome that it 
has not yet reached will be. Neither, indeed, is it judicially supposed to 
know anyway, before it makes that enquiry in earnest into the dimension 
of public interest issues. 
What, for example, would we make of a hypothetical instance where on 
enquiring deeply into a case that is allegedly very positive for the public 
interest the tribunal, to its shock, was to actually find that the merger 
application was anathema for the purposes of a certain public interest 
consideration? 
Say, in a matter where black economic empowerment was being dangled 
to the tribunal as a particular strength of the given merger application and 
the tribunal on closer examination of the matter were to find that the claims 
to be favorable for black economic empowerment were, in fact, true only 
on the surface? 
That in fact the transaction was hiding a sinister insidiously camouflaged 
anti black economic empowerment dimension? So much so that the 
tribunal could not then in fact see itself approving such a merger? 
In other words prior to a due process enquiry into the merits of the public 
interest question presenting in a given matter, a proper call on the true 
status in that regard can surely not be safely made 
Secondly, it seems to the writer that Parliament also contemplated the 
development of a body of case law where, interalia, the treatment in some 
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detail by any competition-deciding forum seized with a public interest 
determination question, as occasioned (black economic empowerment, no 
less) would gradually but increasingly augment the impact of this new 
competition law dynamic in South African society. 
Even if it were proved that it was not a particular concern of Parliament in 
so framing the said new Competition statute, it is clearly desirable for the 
development of greater certainty on the breathing propensities of this new 
lung cxcii of South African competition law and practice, that the 
competition law bench does not, with respect, lightly by-pass opportunities 
to treat of these considerations in the judgments of the tribunal. 
Otherwise, case law on some aspects of the doctrine of the public interest 
may remain thinner than it could be, well into the future. This, in turn, could 
possibly stunt the development of the fledgling keenly public interest 
conscious culture of regulating competition in the country. 
It is arguable that even where these observations of the tribunal amounted 
to no more than obiter dicta in certain instances, nevertheless the 
approach thereof to such newly affirmed criteria of our new body of 
competition law would help inculturate a strong judicially enabled climate 
of what the same really entailed in practice. 
The author will, of course, be the first to admit that abita dicta by definition 
is a natural by product of judicial reasoning, as waves are to the sea. No 
attempt to be prescriptive to the bench in this regard is being made, as the 
same would not only not be competent if attempted, it would also be like 
trying to hint to the mighty ocean what shape and rhythm its waves should 
assume ... 
cxcii To coin a phrase 
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3.3 MERGER TO RESULT IN EXIT OF A VERY SUCCESSFUL BLACK 
BUSINESS AND EXPANSION OF THE "TRADITIONAL CORPORATE 
RETAILERS" 
In VODACOM GROUP (PTY) LTD AND COINTEL VA (PTY) L TDcxciii the 
proposed merger was to see the exit of what appeared to be a particularly 
thriving black owned business from this particular sector of the market and 
the further growth of "one of the traditional corporate retailers,.cxciv. 
There were also some intimation on record that Mr. Hassid of Magic 
Merkel (the target firm) had been pressurized to enter into the sale by 
Daimler Chryslercxcv. Notwithstanding this, indications were clearly that he 
now wished to proceed and had formally disclosed it of record that he had 
no issue with the sale's proceeding to completion. 
With this firm emergent posture of the seller the tribunal's hands were then 
tied and it could not pursue the issue of the alleged forced sale. Neither 
could the alleged exit of what appeared to be a particularly thriving black 
owned business and the further growth of "one of the traditional corporate 
retailers" be made an issue. 
It would appear, this so as the ones that would ordinarily be sought to be 
empowered were, in this deal anyway, also very much pleading for the 
merger to be approved. As emerges in the immediately following 
Vodafone case and in the Tepco caseCxCvi, purporting to "protect" the 
previously disadvantaged by gainsaying their business and investment 
decisions is fraught with thorny difficulties; accusations of paternalism not 
being the least of these. In the event the merger was approved. 
Unconditionally 
cxciii CASE NO. 52/LM/JUNE 05 Competition Tribunal website 
cxciv Case NO.52 Supra 
cxcv Case NO.52 Supra 
<xcvi infra, Para 3.11, 83 
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3.4 BEE CONSIDERATIONS AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
In VODAFONE GROUP PPL AND VENFIN LIMITED / BUSINESS 
VENTURE INVESTMENTS NO. 951 LIMITED AND VENFIN GROUP 
FINANCE (PTY) LIMITED AND STEERScxcvii on a procedural question 
the Tribunal clarified the legal point that in terms of the Competition Act, it 
did not have the legal authority to instruct parties into whose favour they 
should dispose of their assetscxcviii. 
To coin a phrase, the Tribunal stated that it was not "cupid's quiver for 
consummating nuptials of the merger species". At ~he very most, the 
Tribunal is authorized to deny merger consent on the grounds set out in 
the Competition Act and accordingly no party could properly seek relief in 
terms of which the tribunal had to issue an order directing a party 
disposing of its assets as to who to sell those assets to. cxcix The nearest 
relevant provision in the Act is section 12 A (3) (c) which states: 
"When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on public 
interest grounds, the Competition Commission or the Competition Tribunal 
must consider the effect the merger will have on the ability of small firms 
or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to become 
competitive." The tribunal found that no lawful reading of even this 
provision could confer on the Tribunal the power to direct a party as to 
whom to sell assets toCC 
The black owned business being taken over was resoundingly 
acknowledged to be quite successful, indeed. Accordingly, whatever other 
motive may have contributed it can hardly be disputed that its being 
merger targeted was manifestly triggered by the success story that it was, 
cxcvii CASE NO. 111/LM/NOV 05 Competition Tribunal website 
cxcviii CASE NO. 111 supra 
mix Case NO.111 Supra 
cc Case NO 111 Supra 
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which made it quite attractive to the acquiring firm. In that light 
competitiveness could hardly be said to be something it was materially or 
particularly in need of. 
The said section of the Competition Act, in any event, does not stipulate 
an "increase" in competitiveness where it is already in meaningful 
existence. The word employed "become" has a patently transitional 
contextual sense to it; that of facilitating "becoming" competitive. 
Viewed differently, the interpretation of the application of this provision can 
only be proper when such firms sought to be empowered's quest for 
competitiveness is viewed in the context of main stream big business, 
from which the proprietors of such black firms were basically denied or 
limited access in a plethora of ways and for a number of reasons; hence 
disadvantaged. 
Moreover competitiveness is surely an elastic concept as distinguished 
from a rigidly absolute one. "To be competitive" therefore arguably 
includes "increased" competitiveness". Once a black owned business 
ceases to be so owned, any increase in competitiveness it may acquire in 
its merged form would patently not be a thrust in the direction of increasing 
the ability of small business, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become more competitive. 
Nevertheless, both expressions, to "become competitive" (which is already 
in the law) and to "become more competitive" followed by the words "as 
the case may be" would arguably have been a more versatile, 
comprehensive and less controversial way to couch the terms of this 
aspect of the Competition Act. 
The tribunal herein further drew attention to its having adopted "a 
deferential view" to public interest issues in its construction of the terms of 
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the Competition Act, where "some other instruments of regulation" pertain 
to similar issues"cci. 
It was yet further highlighted that in the ShelifTepco decision the Tribunal 
noted, "the role played by the competition authorities in defending even 
those aspects of the public interest listed in the Act is, at most, secondary 
to other statutory and regulatory instruments." 
The Telecommunications Act and the ICASA Act were alluded to as 
pieces of legislation in point in that regard, with the ICT Charter being 
mentioned as relevant in that these instruments all address "more directly 
and appropriately the equity issues raised by the objectors" than does the 
Competition Act's merger control provisionsccii . 
Accordingly, the tribunal ruled that the objection filed was of no legal 
consequence or "substance." The merger was accordingly approved 
unconditionally. 
3.5 BEE AND MINING CHARTER CONSIDERATIONS 
In the matter of PAMODZI INVESTMENT HOLDINGS (PROPRIETARY) 
LIMITED ALLIED AND PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS (PTY) 
LTD & OTHERScciii the parties to the merger represented to the court that 
the subject merger would enable RBN to expand the scope of its activities 
in the mining industry. 
Furthermore, the merging entities stated that it would be through the 
merger project that the Implants Group would be enabled to accomplish 
"the objectives of the MPRD Act and the Mining Charter". 
cci Case NO.III Supra 
ccii Case NO.III supra 
cciii CASE NO. 22 Large Mergers MAR,2006 Competition tribunal website 
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Other than this positive aspect the Tribunal found no other "public interest 
issues" in this matter. In agreement with the Commission' submissions the 
Tribunal approved the merger unconditionally. 
3.6 BEE CONSIDERATIONS: ENGEN ALREADY EMPOWERED AND 
THEREFORE NO MERGER SPECIFIC EMPOWERMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS: ANTI COMPETITIVE MERGER TO IMPACT 
NEGATIVELY ON ALREADY COMPLIANT OIL COMPANIES 
In the SASOL LIMITED, LIMITED, PETRONAS INTERNATIONAL CORP 
AND SASOL OIL (PTY) LIMITED ENGEN LlMITEDcciv CASE the only 
public interest benefit posited was in respect to the BEE opportunities 
allegedly afforded by the proposed merger. 
This line did not inspire the tribunal as Engen was already empowered and 
Sasol admitted that it was introducing "empowerment partners into its fuels 
business" merger or no merger. In other words such empowerment 
initiatives were not merger specificccv. 
Notwithstanding whether the merger took place or not, Sasol Oil would 
imperatively, as per the dictates of the industry specific empowerment 
charter dispose of the portion of its equity to "historically disadvantaged 
persons" necessary for it to achieve compliance in this regardccvi • 
Indeed, by this time most, if not all its major competitors in the fuels 
energy sector had already complied in this regard and such compliance 
pressures on SASOL OIL were probably already intense. 
eeiv Case No. 101 Large Mergers,Dec2004 
eev Case no 101 supra 
eevi Case No 101 supra 
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The tribunal also took a particularly dim view of the emergent "anti-
competitive" effect of the proposed merger and considered that it would 
significantly negatively impact the retail arms of the Opposing Oil 
Companies where, as it turned out, the most significant Black Economic 
Empowerment had to date taken placeccvii. 
The tribunal was particularly persuaded in this vein by the eloquent input 
of Mr. Mncwango of Masana, who disclosed that the proposed merger, 
especially if it resulted in the "prioritization against the Oaks commercial 
and industrial customers" contended for by the merging entities, "would 
lead to the demise of Masana,lCCviii. 
It was submitted on behalf of the merging parties that the merger, if 
approved, would also enable a more "balanced company' that would in 
turn advance the interests of the company and hence reduce "the cost of 
capital and better enable the empowerment partners to fund the 
acquisition of their Stake"ccix. 
The tribunal noted that no real effort was made to demonstrate this 
contended advantage and the Tribunal was not persuaded that the same, 
even if it were proved, could "ever countervail" the profound effect of a 
probable "reduction of competition in the markets" pertinent to the merger 
matter. 
The tribunal also expressed its distinct unease in what, for all intents and 
purposes, was a "direct trade off between our competition finding, on the 
One hand, and the cost of empowerment financing, on the other". 
The Tribunal was strongly persuaded that "the "balance'" sought 
ccvii Case no 10 1 supra 
ccviii Case No. 101 supra 
ccix Case No 101 supra 
and underpinning the proposed merger transaction increased the future 
outlook of the merger entity's market power. 
It was ultimately for these reasons that the merger transaction 
was not approvedccx• The strenuously driven BEE centric alleged 
prospective public interest benefits of the proposed transaction, besides 
the difficulties of proof of their efficacy and of their merger specificity, 
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could not in the end torpedo the overwhelming anti competitive market 
power attributes bedeviling the prospects of this merger application. 
3.7 MERGER TO BRING BEE ENTITY INTO MARKET IN ISSUE 
AND TO CREATE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NEW JOBS 
In ANGLO SOUTH AFRICA CAPITAL (PTY) LTD, EYESIZWE COAL 
(PTY) LTD, MAFUBE COAL MINING (PTY) LTD AND NORTH MINING 
BUSINESS AND ADDITIONAL RESERVESccxi the tribunal noted that the 
merger would enable a BEE entity's entry into this market, the steam coal 
market band and the prospect of the creation of 500 extra jobs that would 
submittedly be facilitated by the merger. 
While it is quite common in its body of case law for the Tribunal to be quite 
wary of the prospect of significant merger triggered retrenchments, it 
seems to the author rather rare for the Tribunal to particularly laud the 
creation of new jobs. 
In this case the Tribunal in addition to indicating that there were no 
negative concerns on the public interest front actually highlighted that the 
merger was, indeed, positive in that regard. This was clearly an allusion to 
eex Case No. 101 supra 
eexi Case No.44 Large Mergers, May 2005,Competition Tribunal 
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the creation of the 500 new jobs. The merger was accordingly approved 
free of conditionsccxii .. 
3.8 SMALL BUSINESS ENTITIES OWNED BY PREVIOUSLY 
DISADVANTAGED PERSONS TO BE AFFORDED GREATER 
COMPETITIVENESS: NO IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT 
In COMMUNITY INVESTMENT VENTURES HOLDING (PTY) LTD, 
COMMUNITY INVESTMENT VENTURES (PTY) LTD AND COMMUNITY 
INVESTMENT HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED, CIE GROUP (PTY) 
LlMITEDccxiii the submissions of the merging entities disclosed that the 
merger would impart no negative effects on employment enabled by that 
the businesses would go on doing business after the merger as before it. 
According to the merger parties one of the key advantages availed by the 
merger was that it would allegedly strengthen the capacity of "small 
businesses or firms controlled by or owned by historically disadvantaged 
persons to become competitive". 
One of the observable quirks here is that the Tribunal does not speak 
directly to these alleged claims of the project capacitating the said small 
firms to become more competitive. 
In some matters where a positive public interest consideration was being 
touted, when skeptical about a submission the tribunal would expressly 
state it. If it was of the mind that the claims were unquantified, like it was in 
the proposed major petroleum merger between interalia Sasol and 
EngenCCXiV, it actually clearly so indicated. 
ccxii Case No 44 supra 
ccxiii CASE NO.23 Large Mergers MAR 2005, Competition Tribunal Website. 
ccxiv Supra, 68, Para 3.6 
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In this particular matter one is left to speculate whether the tribunal's 
stating no more than the fact that such claim was made by the merging 
parties discloses its concurrence with the merging entities' claim or its 
veiled skepticism. 
Perhaps the indication at the end of the written judgment that "there were 
no significant public interest considerations" was the Tribunal's way of 
disclosing that whether the merger parties were right or wrong, their point 
would not have altered the public interest landscape in this regard to any 
degree that really mattered. 
In the event the merger was approved unconditionalltCxv. 
3.9 AFROX -"MEDI-CLINIC"CASE - THE GENUINESS OF THE 
PRESENCE OF BEE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE IMPACT 
THEREOF TESTED BEFORE TRIBUNAL 
In the matter of BUSINESS VENTURE INVESTME NTS 790 (PTY) LTD 
("BID CO") AND AFROX HEALTH CARE LIMITED ("AHL,,)CCXVi several 
issues were examined, one of them being the effect of the alleged 
presence of BEE considerations on the approval process dynamics of a 
proposed merger. 
Significantly the finally approved merger differed materially from the 
initially proposed merger structure placed before the Tribunal.ccxvii 
The final transaction was minus Medi-Clinic, a Significant player in the 
private hospital market. 
eexv Case No.23 supra 
eexvi Case No.105 Large Merger, Dec, 2005,Competition Tribunal 
eexvii N Hlatshwayo supra 
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The BEE dynamic is an important one in the prevailing South African 
economic climate and was a critical force in this transaction as well. 
Such dynamic's impact on this transaction is aptly grasped by the tribunal 
and expressed in the following terms: -
"The transaction represents a rare opportunity to acquire a significant 
stake in a business such as a health-it is large, well placed in its sector, it 
also represents the first intervention by BEE Investors in the health care 
sector and is one of the largest BEE transactions ever."ccxviii 
In the initial effort towards the merger herein in which Medi Clinic was 
participating, the Tribunal faced the challenge of having to determine 
whether this was a genuine BEE transaction and if so to what extent it 
wasccxix. 
In delivering its judgment the Tribunal usefullyCCXX revisited the structure of 
the deal as it had first been mooted and reasoned thus:" the major reason 
for Medi-Clinic assuming control over A health and its BEE shareholders 
was to give effect to an agreement in terms of which Medi-Clinic would 
have acquired approximately one-third of A health capacity, thus changing 
the complex landscape in the private hospital market. As disturbing is the 
fact that Medi-Clinic had sought to achieve this outcome by the most 
cynical manipulation of the government and the Competition Act's support 
for black economic empowerment"CCxxi Very strong words indeed!! 
It comes out manifestly clearly from such terminology that the Competition 
authorities simply loath anticompetitive mergers' weaving into deal 
structures, almost by subterfuge, BEE characteristics so that, as it were, 
eexviii Case No. lOS supra 
eexix N Hlatshwayo supra 
eexx As a point of reference for future merger deal structuring 
eexxi Case No. lOS supra 
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as a "Trojan Horse,.ccxxii they can try and enter the economy without being 
discerned for the anti-competitive influence they really are. 
In addition, the particularly powerful message here is that the most 
compelling presenting BEE case will not in and of itself per se warrant its 
being accommodated by the tribunal if it is housed in a particularly 
unpalatable market inefficient merger vehicle. 
The merger was finally approved subject to some conditions and it was 
termed by the Tribunal to be "an important boost to black economic 
empowerment"CCXXiii 
3.10 DO THE DYNAMICS OF FOSTERING AND ENHANCING A BEE 
CULTURE INCLUDE ARTIFICIAL PRESERVATION OF A FAILING 
FIRM THAT WILL NO LONGER BE CONTROLLED BY PREVIOUSLY 
DISADVANTAGED PERSONS;IF THAT, SO AT ANY COST? THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEE, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
REVISITED 
In the SHELL SOUTH AFRICA (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED ("SHELL 
SOUTH AFRICA")AND TEPCO PETROLEUM (PROPRIETARY) 
LIMITED matterCcxxiv we see the entity Thebe Investment Corporation 
("Thebe'), a black empowerment investment holding company 
incorporated to mobilize economic opportunities to empower previously 
disadvantaged people and communities, the proprietor of Tepco, "an 
employer of 38 people, 80% of whom were historically disadvantaged". 
Tepco was the proprietor of 14 gas stations around the country and, quite 
significantly, "was failing". 
ccxxii N Hlatshwayo supra 
ccxxiii Case No.1 05 supra 
ccxxiv CASE N066 Large Merger OCT, 2002 Competition Tribunal website 
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Thebe offered to sell T epco to Shell South Africa and as part of the deal 
structure simultaneously "acquire 17.5% to 25% of Shell South Africa 
Marketing"Ccxxv. 
Shell South Africa Marketing sought to retain the Tepco brand as a distinct 
and stand alone brand for the immediate future, to grow it in the market for 
as long as it could be profitable, to maintain Tepco's management which 
was very largely blackccxxvi. 
In keeping with the South African oil industry's empowerment charter of 
placing in the region of 25%(twenty five per centum) of "ownership and 
control" with previously disadvantaged persons within a decade, Shell's 
key strategic intent in acquiring Tepco was to enable its so partnering with 
"previously disadvantaged South Africans". 
Having expressed no reservations regarding the competitive efficiency of 
the proposed merger, the Commission submitted to the Tribunal that the 
merger should be approved, however, subject to three conditions, pivoted 
to advance the critical matter of black economic empowerment. 
The conditions were: "1) that Tepco continue to exist jointly controlled by 
Thebe and Shell S.A., 2) that Tepco be maintained as a viable brand, and 
3) that any agreement between the parties be submitted to the 
Commission for approval"ccxxvii. 
On the public interest issues and the Commission's submissions, the 
Tribunal proceeded as follows: 
eexxv Fox ,Sullivan and Peritz, cases and materials US ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT,2ND ed by 
Thomas West,353 
eexxvi Fox and others supra 
eexxvii Fox and others supra 
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On the first suggested condition: - effectively that Tepco be enabled to 
continue to survive in the market controlled/owned collectively by Thebe 
and Shell South Africa, the Tribunal's reservations with it summed 
themselves up in that this would effectively be a restructuring of the 
transaction in a configuration that was desired by none of the merging 
entitiesccxxviii. 
The tribunal underlined the fact that Tepco was not in any event still 
capable of surviving as a stand-alone company. The difficulties of this 
particular proposition were above all else those of structureccxxix. 
This so in that a small entity constrained in a "low return segment of the oil 
industry's value chain" had virtually no chance of maintaining "sustainable 
growth"CCXXX . 
The tribunal's attitude to the submission was ultimately that the said 
condition could not be a solution to what was a fundamental difficulty; that 
Shell as a shareholder would not cure Tepco's ailments and. even more 
significantly, Shell would in all probability decline accession to an 
arrangement that "kept the companies separate operationally"CCxxxi. 
Cutting most incisively to the marrow of the matter was the tribunal's 
penetrating observation, to wit, "Empowerment is not furthered by obliging 
firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to continue to exist 
on a life support machine"ccxxxii. 
Quite soundly, the tribunal frowned on what seemed to be an attempt to 
resuscitate a firm owned or controlled by historically disadvantaged 
ccxxviii Fox and others supra 
ccxxix Fox and others supra 
ccxxx Fox and others supra 
ccxxxi Fox and others supra 
ccxxxii Fox and others supra 
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persons and keep it on "life support' merely to preserve its BEE 
statusccxxxiii. Indeed, considering "empowerment" as a dynamic force per 
se , one has wonder as to what the preservation of a "life support" status 
has to do with empowerment? It has nothing to do with growth or 
strengthening which are central concepts to the very notion of 
empowerment. On the contrary in seeking to preserve that which is 
definitely failing with no tangible recovery strategy, it seems to have 
everything to do with what could be termed "a culture of denial of imminent 
death". 
Indeed, a touch amusingly, sight seemed to have been lost by the 
Commission (as the tribunal hinted) of the fact that the BEE nature of the 
ownership or control of Tepco was, in any event, to cease post merger (as 
appears more fully infra)CCXXXiV. 
Put in other words, despite the very best of intentions to deepen the roots 
of empowerment, that which seems the best BEE medicine might 
operationally turn out to be the worst form of slow poison to the very entity 
sought to be enabled and strengthened To paraphrase a common saying, 
"sincerity is no guarantee against being earnestly wrong". 
On the second condition - that the Tepco brand be kept going as "a viable 
brand in the market place" the tribunal would not accept that this would be 
solution was" self-standing" and was of the view that it had to be coupled 
to the first'; If that be so, then it was burdened with the shortcomings of the 
first, to wit, enabling the continued limping of "a non-viable option". 
The tribunal highlighted that it was not one of the merging entities' 
submissions that they would do away with the "Tepco brand". Indeed, 
ccxxxiii Fox and others supra 
ccxxxiv Fox and others Supra 
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during the tribunal hearing Mr. Shongwe, the Tepco Managing Director 
confirmed this factCCXXXV 
Since there never was an immediate intention to dispense with the 
TEPCO brand on Shell's part, one might add to these words of the tribunal 
application of the well-worn phrase, "If it is not broken do not fix it". In 
earnest Thebe and Tepco desired that Shell South Africa should have the 
freedom to make this judgment call for themselves. There was no public 
interest served by imposing on them the compulsory continuation of a 
brand name. 
The tribunal looked at the other side of the coin and indicated that if it was 
mistaken and such latter said condition was, indeed, "self standing" then 
the tribunal could not grasp what anomaly the condition was intended to 
address, as after the merger Tepco would be "owned and controlled" by 
Shell SA Marketing. Thebe, the previous "controlling shareholder" of 
Tepco would then be shareholder in Shell SA Marketing, albeit, in the 
nature of things, a minority oneccxxxvi. 
"Why?" the Tribunal puzzled, devise a mechanism that on the face thereof 
is Intended to preserve the "competitive position" of Tepco, a company 
that would not any more be under the control of "historically disadvantaged 
persons"? 
Besides, since Tepco was a failing firm at the time of the merger 
application, with respect, what "competitive position" was really 
contemplated by the Commission in that regard? Or was Shell South 
Africa being effectively asked to make Tepco competitive and thereby help 
feed an illusory notion that it had been, indeed, competitive at all material 
times herein? Surely, not!! 
ccxxxv Fox and others Supra 
ccxxxvi Fox and others Supra 
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Albeit the phrase "competitive position" can be used loosely to mean the 
"vantage" point from which a firm supposedly competes in the market 
place, is its use not really hollow and mere words when all party 
stakeholders concerned are agreed that for all intents and purposes the 
given firm is not only uncompetitive in its industry sector and market, but 
that it is in fact distinctly failing? 
If Tepco, in its form before the merger was in earnest transacting an "anti-
competitive agreement" with Shell, the Commission could, as per the 
terms of Section 1 0 (3) (b) (ii) of the Competition Act, have been able to 
mull over the issuance of an exemption on the basis that "the anti-
competitive agreement promoted the ability of a firm owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons to become competitive"ccxxxvii. 
However, as of the nature of the mooted merger as soon as Tepco's 
ownership "has changed hands there can be no earthly reason for 
protecting its competitive position" as it would then clearly no longer be in 
the ownership or control of "historically disadvantaged persons"ccxxxviiiand 
no empowerment purpose could possibly be served thereby. 
The tribunal noted that the Commission's being at pains to disclose that it 
was not trying to resist the merger was all well and fine, but the stark 
reality was that unavoidably, interposing the condition on the purchaser 
would materialise at "a price". 
Ironically Thebe, "precisely the firm owned and controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons" would be the entity to incur such a price! A case 
then perhaps of black economic disempowerment, or so the writer seems 
to gather the Tribunal's agonizing to be here. 
ccxxxvii Fox and others Supra 
ccxxxviii Fox and others supra 
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Indeed, added the Tribunal, Tepco's poor financial health compounded the 
position yet further as had it been in "perfect health" the Commission 
would nevertheless surely have to thread with particular care when, in the 
name of supporting the "historically disadvantaged investors", it intervened 
in a business determination by such an investor. 
The tribunal spotlighted consideration of the following eminently plausible 
scenario: Thebe, in its commercial wisdom, may have decided to 
consolidate and expand its interests in the leisure and tourism industry. In 
order to do this it may have elected to dispose of its assets in the oil 
industry. White owned and controlled firms obviously do this with impunity 
- it represents a significant and perfectly respectable mode of financing 
business expansionccxxxix. 
The tribunal further hinted that the Commission should perhaps consider 
whether it really was the case that its suggested condition would only 
impact on the seller, the target firm, to dispose of its assets peculiarly to 
an acquirer who would be prepared to "accept these conditions". To state 
this in other words, Thebe in such a scenario would effectively be forced 
"to offer its assets at a discount" due to the fact that they would 
situationally be shackled and burdened with onerous conditions 
constraining "the post-transaction utilization of these assets"ccxl. 
The tribunal's view was that this would also limit "the capital-raising 
options" of entities owned or controlled by "historically disadvantaged 
persons". In so doing these firms would be marginalized to the periphery 
of the economy and to the borderlines of the sectors in which the 
Commission believed they were capable of making a worthwhile impact. 
eexxxix Fox and others supra 
eexl Fox and others Supra 
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Indeed, in a very strongly worded cautionary note, the tribunal alerted the 
Commission that it could well expose itself to accusations of "paternalism", 
supposedly from the quarters of the very BEE entities it was purporting to 
assist in that regardccxli . 
The tribunal, revisiting the Commission's statutory role in this vein said it 
was "to promote and protect competition and a specified public interest" 
and that it was not to gainsay the wisdom of the business decisions of just 
that sector of the general public that it is duty bound to defend. That this 
was especially so where no hazard to healthy competition was emergent. 
This is one of those judgments that so eloquently speaks for itself that any 
commentary at this point might constitute just that one cook too many that 
finally spoils that broth!! 
3.11 TRANSACTION POSITIVE FOR BEE AND RAISES 
NO ADVERSE PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 
In CROM GOLD RECOVERIES (PTY) LTD AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATE OF SAccxlii : the Tribunal accepted the 
Competition Commission's view that not only did the matter not raise any 
negative public interest concerns but, on the contrary, KBH was controlled 
by two family trusts, the Nichol Trust (60%) and the Baird Trust (40%), 
whose beneficiaries were "historically disadvantaged individuals". 
Minister Erwin, in opening a conference of the Commission interalia 
lauded the SONAE SOUTH AFRICA (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED and 
SAPPI NOVOBOARD merger in which historically disadvantaged persons 
were enabled to "participate in the mainstream economy"CCXliii. 
ccxli Fox and others supra 
ccxlii Case No. 66 Large Mergers Feb. 22, 2002,Competition Tribunal website 
ccxliii Case nO.31 Large Mergers, May 2002 Competition Tribunal website. 
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He highlighted how this transaction "undertook to promote procurement 
strategies" to lend support to SMMEs from "historically disadvantaged 
communities"ccxliv. This was to be achieved by means of "sub contracting 
technical services" and enterprises owned by black people to be 
integrated into "sales, repairs and maintenance of gas equipment"CCxlv 
(v) PART "e" 
4.0 "PARTICULAR INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OR REGION" 
In ISCOR LIMITED AND SALDANHA STEEL (PTY) LlMITEDccxlvi the 
tribunal not only found anti-competitive considerations in the proposed 
merger but ones hostile to the public interest as well. The public interest 
perspective thereof being constituted in that "the failure of the transaction 
would in all probability lead to a closure temporarily or permanently of the 
firm, and with that a devastating impact on the region"Ccxlvii. 
Moreover the tribunal noted that if the merger proceeded, the parties 
projected that that those affected by retrenchment post merger would be 
fewer than 1 0 (ten) and that this would impact upon "management staff 
(general managers, sales managers, debtors clerks and inventory 
controllers)". 
Thereupon it was projected that a further 40 employees would leave 
Trident's employ "at a normal industry rate of attrition". By contrast, if the 
merger consent were declined Baldwin's would be compelled to close 
down certain of its plants and "scale back at others leading to a greater 
loss of employment". 
eexliv Competition Commission Conference,2002 ,Competition Commission website 
eexlv Competition Conference supra 
eexlviCase NO.67 Large Merger Dec 2001 Competition Tribunal website 
ccxlvii CASE No.67 supra 
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This is, indeed, an important judgment in that it is a matter where the 
Tribunal accepted that the merger entities had "successfully discharged 
the onus of proving that such anti-competitive effects were convincingly 
offset by the efficiency gains of the merged entity". 
This was presumably in invocation of the terms of section 12A(1 )(a)(i) of 
the Competition Act, which provides that in the event that ". it appears that 
the merger is likely to result in any technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain which will be greater than, and offset, the effects of any 
prevention or lessening of competition, that may result from the merger, 
and would not likely be obtained if the merger is prevented .. " The merger 
was against this background approved. 
4.1 LOSS OF AN INDEPENDENT VOICE IN THE PRINT MEDIA 
In JOHNNIC PUBLISHING LTD AND NEW AFRICA PUBLICATIONS 
LTD ccxlviii the Freedom of Expression Institute ("FEI") made written 
representations to the Commission that Johnnic was acquiring the 
Sowetan" in order to "dumb down its content" so that it could "compete 
vigorously" with the Daily Sun.That this purchase would result in the loss 
of one of "of the independent voices in the print media". 
The FEI made no appearance before the Tribunal to elaborate on its sent 
in documented representations. The tribunal, while appreciating in 
principle the concern that media mergers could conceivably result in "a 
lessening of independent voices in the media" was not at all persuaded 
that the FEI had proved that, if at all there were to be a change in "the 
Sowetan's positioning"; that same would necessarily be a consequence of 
the merger transaction and that "the owners" would not have done it 
outside the context of the merger. 
ccxlviii CASE NO. 36 Large Merger, APR 2004,Competition tribunal website 
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Neither did the Tribunal find that if there were to be a change of strategy 
by Johnnic on the positioning of the Sowetan, as alleged (which allegation 
in the Tribunal's assessment had not been proved) it would necessarily 
have reduced the "number of voices" in this market to a material degree. 
This is yet further evidence of the fact that the Tribunal will simply not 
tolerate sweeping sentimental submissions that fail to shift the burden 
proof on the underlying allegations on to the shoulders of the merging 
entities. Public interest, in other words, still has to be proved like any other 
allegation through which a material impact is sought to be made on the 
proceedings; it is no magic wand for those with some socio-economic 
gripe to wave or some instant cure, all social diseases healing pill for them 
to take. 
With the transaction not disclosing any significant public interest issues, 
the Tribunal agreed with the Commission's submission that merger 
consent be granted unconditionally. 
(IV) PARTD 
5.0 "THE ABILITY OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIES TO 
COMPETE IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS" 
In BOART LONG YEAR (A DIVISION OF ANGLO OPERATING, HUDDY 
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED AND HUDDY ROCK TOOLS (PTY) LTDccxlix 
something of a hobson's choice confronted the Tribunal in that from a 
scenario of the likely loss of about 145 jobs if the merger were permitted, 
non approval of the same would leave things about as negative, as 120 
jobs would nevertheless be lost if the merger were not approvedccl 
eexlixCASE N0.41 ILMA! AUG 03 competition tribunal website 
eel Case NO 41supra 
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The tribunal also had to contend with the reality that Boart's Springs plant 
had to acquire increased volumes that were realizable purely by means of 
the merger for it to continue operating viablyCCli. 
Accordingly if merger approval were to be declined Boart's coring division 
would in all probability be relocated beyond South Africa, to a sister plant 
thereof in the United States of Americacclii . 
Moreover Huddy contended that failing the merger, it would necessarily 
have to cease manufacturing operations and would have to become 
merely a distribution firm with further negative consequences for its 
employment levelsccliii. 
The tribunal was quite concerned that in the light of the "global dynamic of 
the industry", bar the merger, both Boart and Huddy would abandon some 
of their manufacturing activities in South Africa. 
The tribunal keenly took note of the fact that jobs were on the line either 
way as declined merger consent on the public interest grounds of trying to 
prevent the loss of jobs would precipitate the "unintended" very effect of 
worsening the loss of employmentCCliv. The Tribunal ended up concluding 
that approval of the merger subject to certain conditions was the lesser of 
the two evils in the quest to lessen the run on jobs in the circumstancescc1v. 
This case, which has already been discussed supra is, in this instance, 
cited in relation to the discussion of the aspect of limiting the "ability of 
national industries to compete in international markets" contemplated in 
ccli Case No.41 supra 
celii Case No.41 supra 
celiii Case No.41 supra 
celiv Case No.41 supra 
celv Case no.41 supra 
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section 12A(3)(d) of the Competition Act and discloses characteristics of 
"the failing firm" phenomenon. 
Since Boart would have moved its manufacturing in this regard to one of 
its US plants, from a point of view of the firm as a South African entity and 
for purposes of its South African operations, South Africa would have lost 
such manufacturing for export capacity and the South African entity would 
have lost the export business it was enjoying due to such manufacturing, 
as the same would cease with non approval of the merger. 
The question that is moot, though, is whether the locally operating 
subsidiary arm of a foreign multinational falls strictly within a "national" 
industry for the purposes and within the parameters that Parliament had in 
mind when it fingered the mischief in this regard in framing section 12 A 
(3)(d)CCIVi of the Competition Act? 
The word "national" is not defined in the Competition Act and one is left to 
wonder whether it was intended by Parliament in a parochially patriotic 
sense, that a firm had to be South African for all intents and purposes; 
from registration, inception to operations and owned predominantly by 
South Africans for it to form part of a national industry or did it suffice for it 
to simply have an operational presence locally in some industry? This, a 
pertinent question, especially in a political economy transformation 
obsessed socio-political environment in South Africa at the time of the 
enactment of the said competition statute? 
Again perhaps the matter is really a simple one and the reason that the 
word "national" was not even defined by the drafters of the Competition 
Act was because it was intended to have its laid back ordinary dictionary 
meaning, which the Oxford Concise English dictionary, at any rate, defines 
cclvi Brassey and five others 345 
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interalia as "of or common to a nation or the nation". In other words simple 
operational presence within the national boundaries would presumably 
suffice to make a firm belong to the pertinent industry to which that firm's 
operations are customarily accepted to belong. 
From Boart's own point of view, if indeed it formed part of a "national" 
industry, relocating its said manufacturing operations from Springs to the 
US would have meant conducting the same manufacturing within a 
probably higher production fixed overheads environment, including for 
instance labour input costs. This could well have compromised its capacity 
to maintain sufficiently competitive pricing compared to that presumably 
enabled by the cost structure of production in Springs, South Africa. 
To the extent that such would have influenced higher the price at which 
Huddy's would sell the same kind of products after they were 
manufactured at a higher production cost base, it could conceivably have 
alienated some its customers and shrunk its market share overseas. On 
the face of it this would appear to qualify as a case within the meaning of 
the said section 12 A (3)(d) of the Competition Act. 
After all are certain US multinational firms not infamous for moving 
significant production overseas, especially to so called "sweat shops" in 
the Far East (and to some extent to Africa) to avoid the high costs of 
production in the US; especially labour related ones or, as the Americans 
would put it, "labor" induced ones? 
The Tribunal, in any event, finally approved the merger. 
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(iii) PART "E" 
6.0 A BIRO'S EYE'S VIEW OF SOME KEY CONTRASTS WITH THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN APPROACH IN THE TREATMENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
CONSIDERATIONS BY CERTAIN FOREIGN COMPETITION LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 
In contrasting the South African merger analysis approach with that of 
some key foreign jurisdictions, a key distinction that is brought up by the 
authors of the leading South African work, Competition Law, is the fact that 
in countries such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia and 
the European Union "there is no separate "public interest" analysis under 
the law."cclvii It would be simplistic, however, to pretend that the competition 
authorities in such jurisdictions act in an environment free from any 
influence from "broader public interest and political factors,.cclviii. 
The fulcrum that tilts the scale in a comparison of such jurisdictions' 
approaches to the South African one is that their legal competition analysis 
apparatus does not dedicate a compulsory, self-contained consideration 
and determination of the "public interest" dynamic as distinct from the pure 
market efficiency analysis exercise. 
The approach in the United Kingdom, however, is fairly different, as 
basically, instead of a specialized court performing such functions, a public 
and politically accountable functionary, the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry applies a "broad based "public interest" "test" in determining 
the appropriateness or not of approving a proposed merger. 
The one variation to this that the author encountered in the United 
Kingdom's approach was that in the event of it being deemed by a court 
cclvii Brassey and five others 
cclviii Brassey and five others 
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that any "restrictions or information" in any agreement were contrary to the 
public interest, then "the agreement shall be void in respect to those 
restrictions or information provisions". cclix 
In the United States some of the most significant antitrust exemptions 
include those availed to labour Unions and applicable to collective 
bargaining agreements. 
A special exemption applies to the activities of Unions within certain limits. 
In the Case of Apex Hosiery v Leader the United States Supreme Court 
held that "Union monopolization of the labor supply does not violate the 
antitrust laws". A year later in a United States court it was held that the 
union undertakings were exempt from anti trust scrutiny "so long as a union 
acts in its self interest and does not combine with non labor groups" in 
realizing its ends. cclx 
Going back in the history of antitrust law in Israel, in terms of a 1959 law 
we see the definition of cartels and restrictive arrangements excluding 
"labour agreements and arrangements among producers of agricultural 
products"cclxi. These were manifestly motivated by the protection of the 
public interest, which deemed such groups and/or activities as warranting 
special protection in the interests of the public good. 
There can be no doubt that the socio-political history of a country heavily 
influences the evolution of its legal apparatus, with competition legislation 
being no exception in this regard. 
celix JOHN AGNEW, Competition Law,London,1985,1 st Ed, by ALLEN and UNWIN, 135 
celx ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E .. KOY ACIC,STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL ,5 th ed, THOMAS WEST, 1994,574 
eelxi CORWIN D.EDW ARDS,CONTROLS OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES, An International 
Comparison, 1 51 Ed,1967by OCEANA PUBLICATIONS,352 
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In the sense of competition legislation, the concept of BEE would appear to 
be unique to South African competition law and must constitute the most 
significant difference with the said western competition regulation 
jurisdictions in the application infrastructure and in the dynamics of the 
doctrine of the "public interest". 
South Africa's particularly skewed per capita income at the time of political 
transition in the mid-nineties had a very weighty impact on the "historically 
disadvantaged persons" of that country and evidently persuaded the post 
apartheid political powers that a unique codified entrenchment of "public 
interest" in both substantive law and process was peremptory to tangibly 
and systemically alleviate the key historical disparities. 
In this vein it is instructive to consider the remarks of the then South 
African Minister of Trade and Industry in a key note speech to a 
Competition Commission conference:" A key objective of the newly elected 
government in 1994 was to develop and grow the economy, expand the 
economic opportunities that were denied to so many of our people and 
ensure that patterns of ownership started to reflect the demography of our 
country. These policies were set out in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme ... and the result was a body of law that stressed 
competition within the structural change in both the South African and the 
global economy .In addition. Government needs to create opportunities for 
South Africans to participate meaningfully in the economy, particularly 
historically disadvantaged individuals" cclxii 
It is in this regard as well notably distinct from the relatively uncodified (and 
arguably less stringent) approaches of the said western countries to the 
matter of the "public interest". 
cclxii Minister Erwin's speech, Competition Conference, Competition Commission website 
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From a totally different perspective we see again how politics can create a 
climate that takes a deep sense of the importance of their functional 
independence for the competition authorities to ignore. 
In the US Boeing Company IMcDonnel1 Douglas Corporation case we see 
politicians weighing in into the controversy quite early, with Americans 
pronouncing the merger "good for the American economy" and one 
politician even adding that it was good for America "even if consumers of 
airplane seats are somewhat worse off"cclxiii. 
The EC Competition Commissioner of the time (as the name then was) had 
such strong reservations about what was viewed by the Europeans as 
"blatantly anticompetitive and seriously harmful to competition and to 
Airbus" that she issued a threat that if the merger were consummated 
without European Community approval, the European Commission would 
"impose prohibitive fines on Boeing and might seize Boeing planes flying 
into the European Union." cclxiv 
The US federal trade Commission in considering the matter pointed out 
that it had no discretion to approve "anti competitive but "good" mergers". 
and observed that, after all, the "national champion" contention was 
"almost certainly a delusion"cclxv; that the "best way to boost the United 
States' exports, address concerns about the balance of trade and create 
jobs" was to insist on United States' firms competing vigorously at home 
and abroad"cclxvi. The Federal Commission also highlighted that the 
resultant "strengthening of a dominant position" would much impede 
eelxiii Eleanor M Fox, cases and MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION,2nd Ed ,2002 by West Group,955 
eelxiv Eleanor M Fox immediate supra 
eelxv Fox supra, 955 
eel xvi Fox supra, 955 
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competition in the common market and within the sense of "Article 2(3) of 
the merger regulationCClxvii. 
The Federal Commission also considered "the important interest of the 
United States" of which it was alerted by the US department of Defense 
and the Department of Justice who appeared on behalf of the US 
governmentCClxViii .The Federal Commission eventually accepted a complex 
of undertakings from Boeing which embodied a mix of structural and 
behavioral inputs and allowed the merger subject to such elaborate 
conditions. 
The Federal Commission further put in place a stringent monitoring 
regimen to ensure compliance with such conditions. Finally it firmly 
cautioned Boeing to ensure accessibility of its facilities and enable this 
monitoring process to proceed unimpededcclxix. 
While these measures largely assuaged the anxieties of the European 
Community, a Pandora box of controversy opened up regarding the 
"extraterritorial application of national antitrust laws to mergers involving 
foreign companies"cclxx. 
These kinds of controversies are here to stay in the modern world as the 
acceleration of globalization logically discloses more of the same, with 
most of the world's largest mergers' implications reverberating across a 
few oceans, a diverse number of national borders and, to coin a phrase, a 
mix of geo-Iegal competition jurisdictions. 
eel xvii Fox supra 955 
eelxviiiAndrew I Gavil, William E. Kovacic, Jonathan B Baker, 1st Ed, 2002,76 
eelxix Gavil supra 
eelxx Gavil supra 77 
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Indeed, a penetrating look must be taken at the veiled complex inner state 
of this giant corporation "ruled" fast globalizing modern world; what it has 
become and is yet further becoming. 
HertzCClxxi, going to print as early as the year 2001 records that: "Propelled 
by government policies of privatization, deregulation and trade 
liberalization, and the advances in communication technologies of the past 
twenty years, a power shift has taken place. The hundred largest 
multinational corporations now control about 20 per cent of global foreign 
assets, fifty-one of the hundred biggest economies in the world are now 
corporations, only forty- nine are nation states"cclxxii .Could it even be 
seriously debated that a significant degree of such corporate multinational 
expansion has surely taken place by vehicle of mergers, albeit numerous 
takeovers too? 
If use of American folk's casual language could be excused for just this 
phrase, perhaps "we ain't seen nothing yet" in this regard. If Hertz's now 
dated statistics are any yardstick to go by, the corporate multinational 
turbines were only just starting to turn!! 
Characteristic of the bundle of contradictions that this modern world has 
increasingly become, accentuating and inhibiting such globalization is a 
phenomenon that so often in the history of world commerce has triggered 
trade wars. It has also flattered to lure and deceive by presenting as a 
noble "broadened concept" of "the public interest". I will phrase it "National 
interest is public interest". From a European Commission perspective (as it 
then was) that should probably read "Regional interest is public interest". 
cclxxi Hertz Noreena, THE SILENT TAKEOVER, Global Capitalism And The Death Of Democracy, 
Arrow,2001 
cclxxii Hertz supra 9 
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While these phrases embody interests that often co-incide they clearly are 
not identical in nature nor are their terms readily interchangeable. 
In this regard it is interesting to note certain provisions of the US statute, 
the Webb- Pomerene ActCClxxiii in terms of which the US President has the 
legal authority to exempt "some defense contractors and small businesses" 
from the antitrust laws "on finding that the exemption is in the national 
interest". There we go again, alas!! ; so long as there are nations and 
regions of nations on earth, it will not go away; "national interest is public 
interest"; "regional interest, is public interest". 
This dynamic, while apparently self evidentially common sensical as to the 
merits of the thinking sustaining it, is perhaps not quite so simple. This 
being due to that not all public interest is predicated upon an expressly 
enunciated national interest rationale in the very terms and text of the 
enabling statute. The nub of the author's contention in that regard being 
that not all-public interest dynamics are driven purely by nationalistic 
protectionism. 
The fact that the South African Competition Act requires caution to be 
exercised on how a large merger (say, between two South African firms 
with a trading presence only in South Africa) could impact on the 
employees of the merger entities need not trigger the ire of any nation 
across the Atlantic (or for that matter the Indian Ocean). After all, is not the 
fight against reduced employment levels one of the rare issues on which 
the Nations of the world, at least, claim to concur? . 
cclxxiii No.lS U.S.C.A, see ANTITRUST cases, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHE MATERIALS 2nd 
Ed" 1981 WEST GROUP, 76, 1054. 
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(vi) PART "F" 
7.0 SOME CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS 
In concluding, instead of making some sweeping coverall remarks, the 
author has decided instead to discuss a bouquet of capita selecta that 
arguably does not fit snuggly in any of the aforegoing discussion sub-
categories. These nevertheless present public interest issues that are 
important topics in their own right in the context of this research report. 
The said topics now follow sequentially. 
7.1 THE PRESENCE ANDIOR ABSENCE OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
CONSIDERATIONS: A QUEST FOR THE NEGATIVE OR A HUNT FOR 
THE POSITIVE? 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANGLO 
AMERICAN GROUP ("KUMBA RESOURCES,,)CClxxiv:-
In this matter the tribunal was of the view that the matter did not require 
intervention on the basis of public policy. 
Gold Fields argued, in relation to the importance of the public interest 
enquiry, that "If a merger raises no competition problems and no negative 
public interest issues, it must still be prohibited if there is no evidence that 
it can be justified on public interest grounds"cclxxv. Put differently, if there is 
not an overall positive public interest outcome from the merger, it should 
be prohibited. 
The Tribunal disagreed thus: -"While many already consider our public 
interest requirements an anathema to merger control policy, few would 
cclxxiv Case No.45, 2002 Large Merger, Competition Tribunal 
eelxxv Case No 45 supra 
96 
argue for a position that mergers are so inherently harmful, that absent a 
positive contribution to the public interest, a merger that raises no 
competition concerns must be stopped"cclxxvi. 
On the other hand the contrary position is compelling. That is, that a 
merger that raises no competition concerns and no negative public interest 
concerns should be permittedCclxxvii. 
In concluding its assessment on this point the Tribunal intimated that apart 
from the need to establish that the merger" will not have a likely anti-
competitive effect", it must also be established that it " will not have a 
substantial negative effect on the public interest"cclxxviii. 
Potential employment issues were negated by the imposition of conditions 
in relation to both the level and number of employees to be 
retrenchedcclxxix. 
The tribunal limited the number of retrenchments to 2,000 employees at 
managerial and supervisory levelscclxxx. 
The tribunal acknowledged that there was already a significant downturn 
in the mining industry and loss of employment was already a real concern 
in the industry. Nevertheless the tribunal felt assured that the 
retrenchments that were to occur at managerial and supervisory levels 
had readily re-marketable skills in terms of finding substitute employment. 
eelxxvi Case No.45 supra 
eelxxvii Case N045 supra 
eelxxviiiCaSe No.45 supra 
eel xxix Case No.45 supra 
eelxxx Case No 45 supra 
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THE DYNAMICS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO PUBLIC 
INTEREST DESIRABLES, "BEE" AND "EMPLOYMENT" 
PRESERVATION 
Addressing the delegates in one of Commission's conferences on the 
common contention that acquisitions are "crucial for black economic 
empowerment" the then most senior officer of the Commissioncclxxxi, raised 
hypothetically the quandary that would present itself in a situation where a 
new BEE entity that is to acquire a stake and participate in a State owned 
company, where the deal structure was such that 40% or more of the 
employees of this State company were to be retrenched merger 
specifically. He raised the question of "whether this really suffices for 
purposes of BEE; How do we bring a balance to that'>cclxxxii. He said this 
while drumming home the crucialness of the existence and the watchdog 
role of the Commission. 
7.2 IS THE RETRENCHMENT OF AS MANY SKILLED WORKERS AS 
OPERATIONALLY BEARABLE AS AGAINST UNSKILLED WORKERS 
THE SOFT PREMIUM INSURANCE FOR THE APPROVAL OF 
MERGERS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE PROBABLY BE DECLINED 
ON EMPLOYMENT NEGATIVES FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 
In an issue of the Star newspaper's employment centric supplement 
"Workplace", attention is drawn to the plight of "upper level managers" in 
mergers where retrenchments are in the offing. The difficulty "created by 
the overlap between the functions of the competition authorities and the 
dispute resolution institutions under the Labour Relations Act"Cclxxxiii is 
highlighted in this article. 
cclxxxi M Simelane paper ,Competition Conference 
cclxxxii M Simelane paper supra 
cclxxxiii Workplace Staff, Workplace Supplement Star Newspaper 30th August 2006. 
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The contention is made therein that in recent mergers and acquisitions, 
the competition authorities have in instances stipulated conditions to a 
merger that enable a number of " senior management employees to face 
retrenchment" after the merger implementation. 
It is therein contended that the said stipulations by the competition 
authorities were made "without any merger conditions or consultation 
having taken place beforehand with potentially affected persons". 
It is represented that by the time the competition authorities have 
approved the merger and consultations begin in terms of section 189 of 
the Labour Relations Act, it is too late. 
The process dynamics, it is contended, are such that whatever 
consultation is made "becomes meaningless" in that a statutory body has 
already made a prior judicially binding determination on the matter. 
It is posited in the said article that"the overlap currently is too broad and 
requires curtailment". This is presumably a reference to the concurrent 
jurisdiction that the Tribunal enjoys with other statutory labour law related 
institutions that deal with matters that are not specifically excluded in 
terms of section 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Competition ActCClxxxiv 
It would appear food for thought that in the matters discussed herein 
above where senior managers were proposed to be laid off post merger, in 
none of them were any representations on behalf of senior employees 
made or invited to be made by the tribunal. 
cclxxxiv Brassey and five others 341 
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It seems to have sufficed for the tribunal to settle that part of the matter on 
the basis that the senior employees would be factored in in respect of any 
submission made on behalf of the employees generally and that 
retrenchment affected senior employees would most probably be re-
absorbed into the economy fairly easily having regard to their relatively 
more marketable skills. 
Senior managers, of the nature of their status in the company, of course 
are typically not unionized. Indeed, not infrequently the interests of senior 
managers and those of the union in their company, sector or industry, as 
of the nature of the vagaries of the industrial environment, are 
incompatible. 
One wonders whether the tribunal has an undisclosed perception that 
senior managers by virtue of their strategically relatively easier access to 
corporate information as compared to the average low skilled or unskilled 
labourer, that they are some of the earliest employees to know about the 
merger and its likely implications for their jobs? 
That due to such relatively ready access to corporate information as 
important as imminent mergers, senior managers need no cajoling to 
promptly submit the representations they may need and/or wish to make in 
terms of section 54 of the Competition Act, regarding any reservations 
about the merger implications for their employment that they might wish to 
express ?CClxxxv. 
If so, such perceptions WOUld, with respect, be based on a premise that is, 
with respect, often not applicable as management cultures are not 
homogenous and some corporate boards may well be more secretive than 
eel xxxv Brassey and five other 359 
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others prior to reaching a certain stage in their critical due diligence 
processes of merger preparation activity. 
7.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SMALL BUSINESSES 
AND ORGANISED LABOUR IN THE CONTEXT OF 
PUBLIC INTEREST DYNAMICS 
One might be tempted to think that in the context of small business owned 
by the previously disadvantaged persons and organized labour, whose 
members are overwhelmingly from the population of previously 
disadvantaged persons, that a natural alliance against organized capital 
might be a virtually spontaneous one. A somewhat diluted version of the 
old adage "the enemy of my enemy is my friend' in action, perhaps? 
Not so observes Justice Lewis. In analyzing the likely emergent dynamics 
in the establishment of "new constituencies" as a backdrop to the 
inculturation of a new order flowing from the new competition legislative 
dispensation, Justice Lewis concludes that "even on a most populist 
interpretation of the act, organized labour and small business are likely to 
prove fickle allies at best, precisely because of inevitable conflicts, at least 
between their short term interests and the broader interests of promoting 
co mpetition "cclxxxvi 
ccixxxvi Justice Lewis supra, 618 
7.4 HOW FAVOURABLY HAS THE DETERMINATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF PURE COMPETITION ISSUES AND PUBLIC 
INTEREST ISSUES BY AND UNDER THE SAME AUTHORITY 
UNFOLDED IN SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION LAW? 
This is not a question with a single bullet answer. 
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Justice Lewis gives us the ideal launch in discussing this aspect by 
pointing out that "Our act provides nothing by way of rules and guidelines 
for balancing public interest and competition considerations and so these 
have to develop in the investigative practice and in the Tribunal's 
decisions,.cc,xxxvii. 
Bearing in mind these daunting pioneering challenges the Tribunal has 
developed quite an imaginative and helpful body of jurisprudence in its 
interpretation and application of the "public interest" tenets of the new 
competition regime in South Africa, while threading in unchartered waters. 
As can be seen from the above discussed tension on the treatment of the 
category interest of senior managers in large merger triggered 
retrenchment scenarios, this is no simple balancing act. 
Another difficulty that this report discloses is the relative lack of effective 
participation by labour, organized and non-organized, in the "public 
interest" testing processes. 
It may well be that Unions and labour representatives may be far more 
familiar and comfortable with the other mechanisms of labour regulation 
than those affecting employment as a public interest consideration in 
competition law. 
ccixxxvii Justice Lewis supra, 620 
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In this light words have hardly ever been truer than the following: that the 
"classic dilemma" confronting those who would dare to initiate socio-
economic and political change is that "those who stand to lose from the 
reform are well organized and coherent, while those who will benefit from 
the reform and are dispersed and incoherent"Cclxxxviii 
Indications are that the Commission still faces some significant public 
awareness expansion, training and consciencisation challenges in these 
regards for process dynamics to be optimized towards the fuller 
actualization of Parliament's lofty public interest ambitions in the wording 
of the Competition Act. 
The Authors of Competition Law caution that in the raging debate as to 
what is the primary object of the Competition Act that contrary to what the 
early decisions of the tribunal would suggest that market efficiency is the 
dominant aim of the those making decisions in terms of the Competition 
Act, that the tribunal might one day "be overwhelmed by socio-economic 
factors, black empowerment not least" . 
Justice Davis, with a sober optimism wrestles with the same issues thus: 
"the reconciliation of the politics and economics of antitrust has also to 
take place in the law itself and in its implementation. Building a broadly 
based constituency for antitrust will act as a counterweight to the demands 
of the narrow interest groups but it will not make them go away, nor will it 
eliminate the substantive underlying societal concerns that put these 
diverse objectives on the antitrust agenda in the first place". 
Determining BEE and what does not constitute BEE in the public interest 
context as appears in the Afrox case supra has its thorny parts in a post 
cclxxxviiicclxxxviii Justice Lewis, supra 619 
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apartheid environment where there is clearly very little tolerance for 
perceived slow paced transformation among the historically disadvantaged 
persons. 
Is there really a sobering prospect that a debate in earnest could in time 
ensue in populist circles, that could earn the tribunal the reputation of 
nurturing market efficiency sentiments more dearly than BEE ones; 
recklessly placing the Tribunal in disrepute with a significant number of 
some of those putatively less initiated in the fine balancing act and 
delicacy of the application of these legalized policies of the land? 
Some of those in favour of a pure economic efficiency competition 
dispensation would probably submit that the Tribunal has already gone a 
wee bit too far in the other way. 
Indeed, dispensing "simple justice between man and man" from the 
bench in keeping with this famous judicial pronouncement, is more than 
ever before, not for the faint hearted. 
There can be no doubt that Justice Lewis does not belong to the breed of 
the faint hearted. Weighing the nature and the implications of this 
structurally entrenched balancing act challenge facing the tribunal, he 
muses: "Judicial officers decide interest disputes all the time-there is no 
reason why they should find it impossible to balance the conflict that 
sometimes arises between the promotion of competition on the one hand 
and the concerns of a particular interest group on the other."cclxxxix 
Consideration of Section 26 (2)CCXC of the Competition Act, while it does 
enable the receipt of a "response to a public call for nominations" in the 
process of making appointments to the Tribunal, the executive does not 
eclxxxix Justice Lewis supra,620 
eexe Brassey supra 350 
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have to follow this route and neither does it have to accept all, certain, or 
any nominations in the event it does call for nominations at all. 
In that light a significant change in the thinking of the State President of 
that day and/or that of the Minister responsible for competition law related 
issues could one day result in the appointment of a tribunal with a 
significantly different outlook on its role than the present tribunal does on 
matters of public interest, whatever one's view is on the general outlook of 
the present Tribunal. 
Accordingly, the shifting of the sands in this regard is very much 
susceptible to the tribunal's term in office and the blowing of the political 
winds. The prevailing under current battle for Presidential succession 
within the ruling political party in South Africa perhaps makes scenario 
planning in this regard an exercise of some precariousness. 
It could be contended on the contrary that there are a number of checks 
and balances that meaningfully limit the scope of the exercise of power in 
this regard by the Executive arm of government. The provisions of Section 
28ccxciof. the Competition Act stipulates some Executive restraining 
criteria; interalia, that the membership of the Tribunal must not be: "3(a) an 
office bearer of any party, movement, organization or body of partisan or 
political nature (2)[must have]CCXCii a suitable qualification and experience 
in economics, law, commerce, industry or public affairs (2)(c) ;[must]CCXCiii 
be committed to the principles enunciated in section 2"of the Competition 
Act." 
In considering the aforegoing one wonders whether this members' 
qualifications sub- section could not have been more precisely framed, in 
ccxci Brassey supra 350 
ccxcii Author's amplification 
ccxciii Author's amplification 
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that as it stands the impression could well be created that one needed to 
be suitably qualified and experienced in all the fields of endeavour 
specified thereunder. 
Surely this is not the present practice in the appointment of tribunal 
members and neither does it appeal to the writer that the legislature did in 
earnest intend to impose such heavily onerous pre-qualifications on would 
be members thereof. In so intending Parliament would also have 
dramatically reduced the executive arm of government's choice of eligible 
persons for membership; perhaps, on occasion, even paralyzed the work 
of the court in protracted searches for sufficient fully compliant candidates. 
Nevertheless the wording as it stands is truly unhelpful, were it to be 
interpreted strictly. 
Furthermore, the wording "suitably qualified and experienced" and as to so 
qualified and experienced by whose standards is not defined. One is left to 
wonder whether the tribunal might one day be faced with a request to rule 
on a question of the legitimacy of its own establishment, to wit, the 
qualificatory worthiness of its members; perhaps member by member 
thereof. Would its members not then, as it were, face the test of possibly 
becoming judges in their own cause? 
Surely such a question would have to be decided by another, higher court 
of competent jurisdiction, probably one in the Supreme Court division of 
the South African courts hierarchy. This so, for the manner of exercise of 
authority that would really be under challenge would be that of the 
appointing Executive arm of the State. 
The said section 2 of the Competition ActCCXciv is a finely balanced mix of 
the market efficiency and the public interest considerations embodied in 
ccxciv Brassey and five others 340,341 
106 
section 12 A(3),in pursuit interalia of a stronger more versatile South 
African economy, of a more robust position and an increased market 
share for South African business entities in international commerce .. 
Surely the lack of a provision in section 29 of the Competition ActCCXCV, 
(the tribunal members' tenure and removals provision) of a clause 
enabling the State President to remove or to be legally compellable to 
remove a member of the tribunal for evidently failing to demonstrate 
commitment to section 2 of Competition Act in the discharge of Tribunal 
business, renders the said provision a patently unenforceable one, as 
good as it sounds. 
"Commitment" for all its discipline conjuring imagery in one's mind is 
ironically quite a nebulous concept for purposes of legal precision and 
enforceability. 
Section 29(i) and (iii) pertaining respectively to the removal of a Tribunal 
member for "serious misconduct" and "engaging in any activity" that may 
undermine the integrity of the Tribunal" would appear to contemplate the 
usual delinquencies of misbehaving bearers of public office, that could 
occur in relation to other public institutions as well. 
Such would include notable criminal behaviour and/or highly scandalous 
immoral behavior that the public generally considers particularly socially 
objectionable and which tends to bring the institution in which such public 
office is held into significant disrepute. 
The State President would be legally hard put to be heard to properly bring 
under the ambit of the said section 2 of the Competition Act a removal of a 
CCXCV Brassey and five others,350,351 
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member of the tribunal from office, if the member was merely 
philosophically controversial. 
The hypothetical example comes to mind where, for instance, a member 
who with a fair amount of regularity delivers extensively reasoned minority 
judgments dissenting from those of the deliberating panel of the Tribunal 
on which he or she usually sits to hear matters. 
This, without infrequent irritation to the other deliberating panel members 
of the Tribunal!. Could the repeat gainsaying of the majority decisions of 
the Tribunal by this one member, though not binding on the tribunal, be 
said to be promoting an air of notional uncertainty in the advancement 
through Competition law of the of the objects of Section 2 of the 
Competition Act; thence, can a lack of commitment to the objectives 
enshrined in the said Section 2 of the Competition Act by this member be 
therefrom inferred? Not without risking compromising judicial 
independence to a dangerous degree. 
If this hypothetical example of "lack of commitment" may be rather far 
fetched, what would constitute a realistic example of such lack of 
commitment that would in fact be justiciable if displayed by a tribunal 
member. With sincere respect to the drafters of The Competition Act, if 
such is reasonably conceivable the author honestly battled to conjure up in 
his mind a concrete, non-purely hypothetical form that an incidence 
thereof could take. 
Of the matter of minority decisions of the Tribunal, while there is no 
express enabling provision for the same to be made and delivered, there 
is a rich judicial legacy in South African law that a judge may dissent from 
his or her colleagues' judicial position and render a minority judgment. 
That in itself creates a sound platform for continuing such a trite practice. 
Section 31 (6) of the Competition Act, in providing interalia that "the 
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decision of a panel [of the Tribunal]CCXCVi is the decision of the Tribunal" 
adds a further dimension to this reality. 
This provIsion, by virtue of the inherent counter assertion it naturally 
embodies, to wit, that minority judgments, if any, do not constitute the 
decision of the Tribunal, by force of inescapable implication discloses that 
minority judgments, for their weight in law, are also contemplated, where 
emergent. 
7.5 WHAT HOPE FOR THE BUILDING OF NEW CONSTITUENCIES 
TO DEEPEN THE CULTURE OF THE NEW PUBLIC INTEREST 
BUTTRESSING ORDER 
The sad prognosis in this regard is that it will not be the familiar structures 
of organized underprivileged society that will most readily take up the 
cudgels in the quest to deepen this new culture of emphasizing the public 
interest in competition law, but "firstly consumers and secondly, and more 
important [tly]CCXCVii, that broad inchoate mass of citizens who are 
comforted and empowered by the presence of institutions in their society 
tasked with checking the activities of powerful interest groups"CCXCViii . 
This itself begs a question, or does it not? If say, organized labour is 
manifestly not as effective or as organized as it could be in pursuing the 
full enforcement of its constituency's public interest rights, on the flipside, 
as according to the concise Oxford dictionary, at any rate, "inchoate" 
means "just begun; undeveloped, rudimentary, unformed", how much 
activism promise is really latent in civil society? 
ccxcvi The words in the square brackets are the Author's amplification for clarity. 
ccxcvii Bracketed portion ,author's own addition for contextual clarity 
ccxcviii Justice Lewis, supra 619 
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Furthermore in this vein, just how organized is "the consumer". Of all the 
decided matters discussed in this essay, for instance, the author can only 
recall the Johnnic mattereexeix, pertaining to the positioning of the Sowetan 
in the newspaper industry, where a non commercially motivated consumer 
body, the Freedom of Expression Institute ("FEI') actually took the trouble 
to have its written reservations about the merger filed with the tribunal in 
that matter. Again we will recall in this regard that the FEI failed to appear 
before the tribunal when it arguably mattered the most, to steer home its 
contentions in oral submissions at the hearing. 
Clearly the challenge in respect to the need for greater and effectively 
piloted popular and consumer activism in this regard is still huge. 
7.6 THE DESIRABILITY OF HIGHER CASE INCIDENCES ON 
SOME OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUE CLASSES 
As considered herein under the discussion head of employment as a 
public interest category, supposedly of the nature of their particular 
circumstances the bulk of the incidences of public interest cases have 
tended to have an employment/retrenchment consideration leaning. 
Having said that, lingering In the writer's mind, however, is whether this 
reality is purely a consequence of the intrinsic nature of the matters 
coming before the tribunal and not in part due to the weak advocacy of 
those said "dispersed and inchoate ",eee poorly capitalized interest groups 
and lobbies. It is primarily to the benefit of such interest groups, after all, 
that such other aspects of public interest also feature meaningfully in the 
pleadings filed of record before the Tribunal and are fully ventilated at the 
applicable hearings. 
ccxcix Case No 36 12004 Large Mergers supra 
ccc Justice Lewis, supra 619 
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The litigation for merger approval before the tribunal is typically brought by 
organized capital or by the Commission, as mergers, in the nature of 
things, are virtually the preserve of organized capital. 
Large capital would surely not be inclined to play watchdog on whether 
every public interest aspect that could conceivably be pertinent to a 
merger application being heard has been met. In most cases such would 
either invite onerous approval conditions for it or in a worst-case scenario 
result in merger authorization's being declined. 
Whatever the picture when the jury is in on this question, the stark reality 
is that the amount of case jurisprudence on the other aspects of the South 
African public interest edifice requires many more casuistic instances, to 
enable the tribunal's body of case law to develop greater depth and 
settlement in that regard. 
Proceeding for a moment on the premise that lack of suitably robust and 
persistent advocacy from appropriate interest groups has nothing to do 
with the lopsided category incidence of public interest issues coming up 
for adjudication before the tribunal, society is clearly not suddenly going to 
go out if its way to alter the quirks of its socio -economic and political 
dynamics to enable that "balance" to result. 
That will simply have to come with time in the normally fairly unpredictable 
ebb and flow of human affairs, whose complex exigencies have a knock 
on effect on the incidences and disposal time lines of issues coming 
before the courts for determination; those coming up before the Tribunal 
no less. 
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